



**PRIM` AWLA TAL-QORTI CIVILI
(GURISDIZZJONI KOSTITUZZJONALI)**

**ONOR. IMHALLEF
JOSEPH ZAMMIT McKEON**

Illum il-Hamis 18 ta` Marzu 2021

**Kawza Nru. 4
Rikors Nru. 73/2020 JZM**

Giovanna Testa detentrici tal-karta tal-identita` nru. 557123(M), Stephen Testa detentur tal-karta tal-identita` nru. 84762(M), Raymond Testa detentur tal-karta tal-identita` nru. 908551(M), Frederick Testa detentur tal-karta tal-identita` nru. 856854(M) u Joseph Testa detentur tal-karta tal-identita` nru. 50661(M)

kontra

L-Avukat tal-Istat

u

Georgia Fletcher

Il-Qorti :

I. Preliminari

Rat ir-rikors li kien prezentat fil-11 ta` Mejju 2020 u li jaqra hekk :-

1. *Ir-rikorrenti huma sidien tal-proprietà ossia l-fond bl-indirizz Flat 1, Mayfair Flats, Birkirkara Road, San Giljan.*

2. *Dan il-fond ilu ghal zmien twil mizmum b`kirja mill-intimata Fletcher. L-inkwilina zammet u zzomm il-fond b`kirja protetta taht il-Kapitolu 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, li bl-operat tal-Att X tal-2009 u tal-Artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, tintitola lis-sidien rikorrenti jircieu kera fis-somma ta` €205, liema rata tizedied biss kull tliet snin u limitatament skont l-indici tal-inflazzjoni provduti mill-Kapitolu 158 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta.*

3. *Il-protezzjoni li tgawdi l-inkwilina tinkludi provedimenti fil-ligi li jcahhdu lis-sidien rikorrenti milli jiehdu l-pussess lura tal-proprietà, b`dana li huma sfurzati jibqghu jaccettaw rilokazzjoni wara rilokazzjoni tal-kirja - b`mod perpetwu - u b`massimu ta` kera li tizedied biss limitatament kif iprovdut mill-Artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta. Il-kera percepita llum, u anke qabel l-introduzzjoni tal-Att X tal-2009, hija baxxa ferm u `I boghod minn dawk li r-rikorrenti setghu u jistghu jiksbu fis-suq miftugh, kieku ma hemmx l-ligi li tipprevjeni dan.*

4. *Il-protezzjoni mogtija lill-inkwilina bid-dispozizzjonijiet tal-Kapitolu 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, tal-artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, u tal-Att X tal-2009, jikkreaw zbilanc qawwi u nuqqas ta` proporzjonalità bejn id-drittijiet tas-sidien (ir-rikorrenti) u dawk tal-inkwilina (l-intimati Fletcher), stante li l-valur lokatizju tal-fond huwa ferm oghla minn dak stabbilit fil-ligi u ghalhekk tali zbilanc jilledi l-jeddijiet tar-rikorrenti kemm taht l-Artikolu 1 tal-Protokol nru. 1 tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea, u kif ukoll l-artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni ta` Malta. Dan l-istat ta` fatt kien fis-sehh kemm qabel l-introduzzjoni tal-Att X tal-2009, u kif ukoll wara, u għadu fis-sehh sal-lum.*

5. *Il-livell baxx ta` kera, l-istat tal-incertezza tal-possibilità tat-tehid lura ta` proprietà, in-nuqqas ta` salvagwardja procedurali, iz-zieda fil-livell tal-ghejxien f`Malta f`dawk l-ahhar decimi u l-interferenza sproporzjonata bejn id-drittijiet tas-sid u dawk tal-inkwilin ikkreaw piz eccessiv fuq ir-rikorrenti.*

6. *Ir-rikorrenti ma għandhomx rimedju effettiv ai termini tal-htigijiet tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea, stante l-fatt li huma ma jistghux izidu l-kera b`mod ekwu u gust skont il-valur tas-suq illum u anke minhabba li effettivament jistgħu biss jircievu dak l-ammont kif limitat bl-artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta.*

7. Dawn id-dispozizzjonijiet ta` kontroll tal-kirja huma interferenza mhux gustifikata fit-termini tat-tieni paragrafu tal-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokol tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea dwar id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem, u b`hekk jilledu l-jeddijiet tal-mittenti kif sanciti mill-Artikolu 1 tal-Protokol Nru. 1 tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea, kif ukoll l-Artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni.

8. Din il-Qorti kif ukoll il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali u l-Qorti Ewropea pronunzjaw ruhhom dwar din il-materja diversi drabi. F`din il-kawza l-esponenti qegħdin jagħmlu s-solita talba ghall-kumpens biex jigu rimedjati l-leżjonijiet passati. Qieghda ssir ukoll talba ghall-izgħumbrament biex tramite din l-Onorabbi Qorti, l-esponenti jingħataw rimedju minn hawn `il quddiem u cioè billi jottjenu l-izgħumbrament tal-intimata malli din tinstab illi qieghda tokkupa l-fond taht kirja leziva u allura b`hekk invalida u mingħajr effett. Issir riferenza għal dak li ntqal fil-kaz tal-Qorti Ewropea fl-ismijiet ta` Portanier vs Malta (App No. 55747/16), li dderigiet il-qrati Maltin jaġħtu rimedju verament effettiv, bla ma s-sidien ikollhom ghafnejn jagħmlu proceduri duppli biex jottjenu solljev għal-jeddijiet tagħhom. Dan, anke fid-dawl tal-fatt li fl-istess kaz intqal illi hlas ta` kumpens jista` ma jkunx bizzejjed biex jindirizza vjolazzjoni taht il-Konvenzjoni. Huwa għalhekk illi r-rikorrenti qegħdin jitkol fuq ir-rimedju ta` zgħumbrament, naturalment appartu l-kumpens.

Għaldaqstant, jghidu l-intimati `I ghaliex ma għandhiex din l-Onorabbi Qorti jogħgobha, salv kull dikjarazzjoni jew ordni ohra mehtiega :

1. Tiddikjara illi l-intimata Georgia Fletcher qieghda izzomm il-fond riferut hawn fuq b`kirja taht il-Kapitolu 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, bl-operat tal-Att X tal-2009 u tal-Artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta.

2. Tiddikjara illi ghar-ragunijiet fuq spjegati, u ghal dawk li se jirrizultaw fil-provi, il-Kapitolu 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, l-emendi tal-Att X tal-2009, u senjatament l-artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16, jivvjolaw id-drittijiet fondamentali tar-rikorrenti kif sanciti fl-Artikolu 1 tal-Protokoll nru. 1 tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea, u kif ukoll fl-artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni ta` Malta;

3. Tiddikjara konsegwentement illi, il-Kapitolu 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, l-emendi tal-Att X tal-2009, u senjatament l-artikolu 1531C tal-Kapitolu 16 huma nulli u bla effett, erga omnes, jew inkella fil-konfront tal-kirja ta` bejn il-partijiet ir-rikorrenti u Fletcher.

4. Taghti dawk ir-rimedji kollha meqjusa xierqa.

5 Tiddikjara illi b`konsegwenza tat-talbiet precedenti, l-intimata Fletcher m`ghandha l-ebda titolu validu fil-ligi li jtiha l-jedd fuq il-proprietà ossia l-fond bl-indirizz Flat 1, Mayfair Flats, Birkirkara Road, San Giljan.

6. Tordna b`hekk lill-intimata Fletcher sabiex tizgombra mill-proprietà indikata, u dana billi tivvakawha u taghti lura l-pussess shih tagħha lir-rikorrenti, u taghti terminu qasir perentorju għal dan il-ghan.

7. Tiddikjara illi l-intimati jew min minnhom huma/huwa responsabbli għad-danni sofferti mir-rikorrenti minhabba t-telf ta` kontroll, uzu u t-tgawdija tal-proprietà de quo, u l-kumpens dovut lilhom, u tillikwida l-kumpens/id-danni li għandhom jithallsu lir-rikorrenti, u tordna lill-intimati jew min minnhom ihallsu dik is-somma hekk likwidata.

8. Taghti kull rimedju u/jew provvediment iehor mehtieg.

Bl-imghax legali fejn applikabbli, bl-ispejjez kontra l-intimati.

Rat id-dokumenti li kienu prezentati mar-rikors.

Rat ir-risposta li pprezentat l-intimata Georgia Fletcher fil-25 ta` Mejju 2020 li taqra hekk :-

Illi t-talbiet attrici, in kwantu diretti fil-konfront tal-esponenti għandhom jigu michuda fl-intier tagħhom bl-ispejjez, stante li huma nfondati fil-fatt u fid-dritt u dan kif ser jigi ampjament spjegat hawn taht u ppruvat fil-mori ta` dawn il-proceduri :

1. *Illi in linea preliminari, l-esponenti tecepixxi illi hija mhix il-legittima kontradittur fl-azzjoni odjerna tal-allegat ksur tad-drittijiet fundamentali tar-rikorrenti u dana stante li l-ilment attrici huwa wieħed t`indoli kostituzzjonali u konvenzjonali li certament hija ma kkommettitx.*

2. *Illi kif issenjalat din l-Onor. Qorti diversament ippreseduta fis-sentenza tagħha tat-30 ta` Mejju 2018 fl-ismijiet David Pullicino et. vs L-Avukat Generali et. :*

"(..) l-organizzazzjoni tas-sistema legali u gudizzjaria huwa kompitu tal-Istat, u huwa l-Istat li għandu l-obbligu versu r-rikorrenti li jpoggi fis-sehh sistema gudizzjarja li tiggarantixxi u tipprotegi d-dritt tagħhom (Appell Civili nru 73/2001 deciz nhar is-6/2/2015 Sean Bradshaw et vs AG et)

3. *Illi in sostenn tas-suespost, huwa ormai principju pacifiku fil-gurisprudenza nostrana illi "(...) fil-kaz ta` proceduri gudizzjarji lezgi tad-drittijiet kostituzzjonali jew konvenzjonali, huwa l-Istat u mhux ic-cittadin li għandu jirrispondi, galadarba huwa principalment l-obbligu tal-Istat, u mhux tac-cittadin privat, li jassigura li d-drittijiet ta` parti f`kawza ma jinkissrux".*

4. *Illi in linea ma` dak sucitat, huwa għalhekk l-Istat li huwa l-legittimu kontraduttur f`kawzi ta` natura kostituzzjonali u / jew konvenzjonali, b`dan illi l-esponenti għandha tigi liberata mill-observanza tal-gudizzju, bl-ispejjez inkorsi kontra r-rikorrenti.*

5. Illi minghajr pregadizzju ghall-premess, f`kaz li l-partecipazzjoni tal-esponenti fil-proceduri odjerni tigi kkunsidrata bhala essenziali u mehtiega, kemm ghall-integrita` tal-gudizzju kif ukoll peress li l-proceduri odjemi jaffettwawha qua inkwilina tal-fond in kwistjoni, hija m`ghandhiex legalment tirrispondi ghal kwalsiasi inkostituzzjonalita` tal-ligi applikata.

6. Illi konsegwentament, huwa l-Istat biss li jista` jirrispondi ghall-allegazzjoni rigwardanti l-vjolazzjoni o meno ta` xi dritt fundamentali tar-rikorrenti stante li l-esponenti ma tista` qatt tagħti rimedju ghall-allegat lezjoni ta` dritt fundamentali li certament hija ma kkommettietx u b`hekk m`ghandhiex tigi kkundannata tizgombra mill-fond, fl-eventwalita` li din l-Onor. Qorti ssib vjolazzjoni tad-drittijiet fundamentali tar-rikorrenti.

Dan qed jigi eccepit fl-isfond tal-principju assodat kemm lokalment kif ukoll fil-gurisprudenza tal-Qorti Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Umani illi huwa principalment l-obbligu tal-Istat, u mhux tac-cittadin privat, li jassigura li d-drittijiet fundamentali tac-cittadini privati jigu mharsa u li f`kak ta` lezjoni jagħti kumpens.

7. Illi inoltre, il-Qrati Kostituzzjonali tagħna pronunzjaw ruhhom kemm-il darba rigward il-fatt li huma mhumiex aditi bil-kompetenza ratione materiae sabiex jagħtu ordni ta` zgħumbrament, kif gie ssenjalat ad exemplum, fis-sentenza fl-ismijiet Josephine Azzopardi et. vs. L-Onorevoli Prim Ministro et, deciza fis-27 ta` Gunju 2017 :

"Illi gie deciz diversi drabi mil-qrati tagħna li l-proceduri kostituzzjonali mhumiex il-forum addattat sabiex jigi deciz jekk inkwilin għandux jigi zgħumbrat jew le. Din il-vertenza tispetta lill-qrati ordinarji jew lill-Bord li jirregola l-Kera skont il-kaz."

Infatti f`dan ir-rigward, qed jigi eccepit illi l-Artikolu 8(1) tal-Ordinanza li tirregola t-Tigdid tal-Kiri ta` Bini, Kap. 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta, jiprovvdi illi :

"Meta sid il-kera jkun irid jiehu lura l-pussess tal-fond fit-tmiem tal-kiri, huwa għandu jitlob permess lill-Bord għaldaqshekk"

8. Illi bid-dovut rispett, ir-rikorrenti jaghmlu referenza ghall-insenjament tal-Qorti ta` Strasburgu fil-kaz ta` Portanier vs Malta, sabiex jiggustifikaw it-talba tal-izgumbrament, bla ma jsemmu l-fatt li l-Qrati Kostituzzjonali tagħna recentament iddeciedew li jaddottaw pozizzjoni differenti ghalkollox, kif jidher fis-sentenza precetata, fejn gie osservat is-segwenti :

"Li kieku din il-qorti ordnat l-izgumbrament fil-kawza kostituzzjonali - u hekk tagħti dak li t-Tielet Sezzjoni tqis "an impeccably comprehensive remedial action" - kienet tkun cahdet lill-okkupunt mill-jedd ta` access għal qorti, bi ksur tal-jedd tieghu taht l-art. 39 tal-Kostituzzjoni u l-art. 6 tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea ghall-Protezzjoni tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem u tal-Libertajiet Fundamentali: altru milli rimedju "impekkabbli"! F`dak il-kaz imbagħad kien ikun jista` jingħad bir-ragun li din il-qorti tkun abdiżat mir-responsabilitajiet tagħha ghax tkun naqset li thares id-drittijiet ta` kull parti fil-kawza! (...) Wara kollex, ma huwiex minnu dak li jingħad fil-kaz ta` Portanier li din il-qorti għandha "unlimited powers"; fi stat ta` dritt hadd ma għandu unlimited powers u din il-qorti wkoll hija marbuta illi thares u tirrispetta l-ligijiet procedurali tal-pijjiz ukoll jekk hemm min donnu irid li flok ligħiġiet prevedibbli ta` procedura jidhol sistema ta` solvitur ambulando."

9. Illi f`kull kaz u mingħajr pregudizzju, l-esponenti dejjem ottemprat ruħha mal-kundizzjonijiet tal-kera u agixxiet fil-parametri tal-ligi vigenti. Fil-fatt, hija dejjem hallset puntwalment kwalsiasi ammont ta` kera dovuta lis-sidien, zammet l-imsemmni fond f-kundizzjoni tajba u wzat il-fond ghall-iskop li lilha nghata, bla ma qatt issullokat tali fond lil terzi.

10. Salv eccezzjoniet ulterjuri jekk ikun il-kaz.

Għaldaqstant, fl-isfond tas-suespost, l-esponenti qed titlob bir-rispett lil din l-Onor. Qorti jogħgobha tiddikjara l-pretensionijiet u t-talbiet tar-rikorrenti safejn jolqtu li ħalli bhala infondati kemm fil-fatt kif ukoll fid-dritt u konsegwentament tichadhom.

Bl-ispejjeż kollha kontra l-istess rikorrenti jew kontra l-intimat Avukat tal-Istat.

Rat il-lista tax-xhieda ndikati mill-intimata Fletcher.

Rat ir-risposta li pprezenta l-intimat Avukat tal-Istat pprezentata fis-26 ta` Mejju 2020 li taqra hekk :-

1. Illi preliminarjament, ir-rikorrenti għandhom igibu prova cara tat-titolu tagħhom sabiex juru li huma s-sidien tal-fond in kwistjoni kif qed jallegaw fir-rikors promutur.

2. Illi preliminarjament ukoll, għandhom jigu ndikati l-artikoli mill-Kap. 69 u mill-Att X tal-2009 li skont ir-rikorrenti qed jiksruha d-drittijiet fundamentali tagħha għat-tgawdija tal-proprjetà msemmija.

3. Illi fil-mertu, it-talbiet tar-rikorrenti għandhom jigu michuda in toto peress li huma infondati fil-fatt u fid-dritt u dan għar-ragunijiet segwenti li qed jigu hawn elenkati mingħajr pregudizzju għal-xulxin :

4. Illi peress li r-rikorrenti qed jinvokaw il-protezzjoni tal-Artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni, l-esponent qed jeccepixxi l-improponibilità tal-Artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni u dan għal zewġ ragunijiet principali :

a) L-ewwel ghaliex il-kirja mertu ta` dan il-kaz hija mharsa bil-Kap. 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta li hija ligi li dahlet fis-sehh fid-19 ta` Gunju 1931 u skont ma jipprovdi l-artikolu 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni: "Ebda haga fl-artikolu 37 ta` din il-Kostituzzjoni ma għandha tolqot il-hdim ta` xi ligi fis-sehh minnufih qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962 jew xi ligi magħmula fi jew wara dik id-data li temenda jew tissostitwixxi xi ligi fis-sehh minnufih qabel dik id-data (jew xi ligi li minn zmien għal zmien tkun emodata jew sostitwita bil-mod deskrift f`dan is-subartikolu)...".

b) It-tieni ghaliex dan l-artikolu 37 jitkellem biss dwar tehid foruz, jigifieri b`mod obbligatorju, u dan mingħajr ma jagħmel referenza għad-dritt tat-tgawdija tal-proprjetà - kuntrarjament għal-dak li jagħmel l-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropeja. Isegwi għalhekk li l-Artikolu 37 joffri harsien lil dak li jkun unikament meta hemm tehid tal-proprjetà minħabba xi effett ta` xi att tal-Istat. Skont din id-disposizzjoni tal-Kostituzzjoni, l-istess protezzjoni mhix mogħtija meta jkun hemm interferenza fid-dritt għat-tgawdija pacifika tal-proprjetà. Skont din id-disposizzjoni tal-

Kostituzzjoni, l-istess protezzjoni mhix mogtija meta jkun hemm interferenza fid-dritt għat-tgawdija pacifika tal-proprietà. Illi l-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fis-sentenza fl-ismijiet Nazzareno Galea et vs Giuseppe Briffa deciza fit-30 ta' Novembru 2001, osservat illi :

"Una volta din il-Qorti waslet ghall-konvinciment illi l-kaz taht ezami hu wiehed ta' privazzjoni tat-tgawdija u mhux ta' tehid tal-proprietà u konsegwentement ma jaqax fl-orbita` tal-Artikolu 37, mhux il-kaz li tinvestiga oltre jekk il-kumpens mil-ligi stabbilit għal dik il-`privazzjoni tat-tgawdija` kienx wiehed xieraq".

5. *Sabiex wiehed jista` jitkellem dwar tehid forzuz jew obbligatorju, persuna trid tigi zvestita jew spussej sata minn kull dritt li għandha fuq dik il-proprietà. Huwa evidenti li fil-kaz prezenti, tali zvestiment ma sarx u dan peress li bil-kirja r-rikorrenti ma tilfux għal kollox il-jeddiżiet tagħhom fuq il-fond in kwistjoni u għalhekk dan il-kaz ma jammontax għal deprivazzjoni totali tal-proprietà. Illi tajjeb li jigi nnutat li l-Istat ha mizura li tinkwadra ruhha taht kontroll ta` uzu fejn irregolarizza sitwazzjoni ta` natura socjali fl-ambitu tal-gid komuni b`dana però li jibqghu mpregudikati d-drittijet tas-sidien qua proprjetarji tal-fond. Fid-dawl ta` dan kollu, l-ilment tar-rikorrenti ma jinkwadrax ruhu fil-parametri tal-artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni u għandu jigi michud.*

6. *Illi mingħajr pregudizzju ghall-paragrafu precedenti, dato ma non concessu li l-artikolu 37 japplika għal dan il-kaz, xorta wahda ma hemm ebda ksur tal-Artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni u tal-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokol tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea stante li l-fatti tal-kaz prezenti ma jikkostitwixx tehid forzuz jew obbligatorju tal-proprietà izda jikkostitwixxu biss kontroll ta` uzu ta` proprjetà fil-parametri tal-Kostituzzjoni u tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea.*

7. *Illi safejn l-ilment tar-rikorrenti huwa msejjes fuq l-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea, l-esponenti jirrileva li skont il-proviso tal-istess artikolu, l-Istat għandu kull jedd li jghaddi dawk il-ligijiet li jidhrulu xierqa biex jikkontrolla l-uzu tal-proprietà skont l-interess generali. Anki skont il-gurisprudenza kostanti tal-Qorti ta` Strasburgu, l-Istat igawdi diskrezzjoni wiesgha sabiex jidentifika x`inhu mehtieg fl-interess generali u x`mizuri għandhom jittieħdu sabiex jigu ndirizzati dawk il-htieġi socijal. Tali diskrezzjoni tal-legislatur m`għandhiex titbiddel sakemm din ma tkunx manifestament mingħajr bazi ragonevoli - li zgur mhux il-kaz.*

8. *Il-ligijiet li qed jilmentaw minnhom ir-rikorrenti huma mahsuba sabiex jiprotegu persuni milli jigu mkeccija mid-dar ta` abitazzjoni taghhom f`gheluq it-terminu koncess lilhom fil-kuntratt tal-kiri. B`hekk dawn l-artikoli zgur li ma jistghux jigu kklassifikati bhala mhux legittimi jew mhux fl-interess generali u l-esponent jara li dawn l-artikoli assolutament m`ghandhomx jitqiesu li jmorr kontra d-drittijiet fundamentali tal-bniedem.*

9. *Illi l-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokol ma jikkoncedi ebda dritt li xi hadd jircievi profit. Allura, fil-kuntest ta` proprjetà li qed isservi ghall-finijiet ta` social housing, zgur li ma jistax jigi kkontemplat xi dritt simili.*

10. *Illi f`cirkostanzi bhal dawn fejn jezisti interess generali legittimu, ma tistax tpoggi fl-istess keffa l-valur tal-proprjetà fis-suq hieles ma` dak il-valur li wiehed għandu jħallas fil-kuntest ta` social housing. L-ghan wara dawn il-ligijiet huwa li jipprovd u għall-interess generali u cjoe li jipprovd dar ta` abitazzjoni. Huwa risaput li l-Qorti Ewropea stess fil-gurisprudenza tagħha fosthom fil-kaz ta` "Amato Gauci vs Malta" rrikonoxxiet li: "State control over levels of rent falls into a sphere subject to a wide margin of appreciation by the State and its application may often cause significant reductions in the amount of rent chargeable." Il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fis-sentenza tagħha ricenti fl-ismijiet Ian Peter Ellis pro et noe vs Maggur Alfred Cassar Reynaud et tas-27 ta` Jannar 2017 qalet hekk: "Huwa pacifiku li fejn tidhol il-materja ta` akkomodazzjoni socjali l-istati membri għandhom margini wiesa` ta` apprezzament u, sakemm il-mizuri jkunu legittimi, l-ghan socjali għandu jwassal għal kumpens li jista` jkun ferm anqas mill-valur tal-fond jew il-valur lokatizju ta` fond fis-suq hieles."*

11. *Illi jekk fil-kaz odjern kien hemm tnaqqis fil-kera dovuta lir-rikorrenti meta mqabbla mal-valur lokatizju fis-suq, dan it-tnaqqis huwa kontro-bilanciat bil-margini wiesha tal-Istat li jillegisla fil-kuntest ta` mizuri socjali fosthom fil-qasam tad-djar.*

12. *Ma hemm l-ebda dubju li kieku kellu jigi applikat il-prezz tal-kirjet fis-suq ugwalment u fuq l-istess binarju ghall-binjet kollha, kemm dawk fl-ambitu tal-qafas socjali u anke fl-ambitu ta` dawk li mħumix, allura r-rizultat ikun li tinholoq krizi li tħabbi lil hafna familji b`pizijiet li ma jifilhux għalihom.*

13. Illi jekk ir-rikorrenti qed jilmentaw li qed jigu ppregudikati minhabba l-fatt li l-ammont tal-kera ma jirriflettix il-valur reali tal-fond in kwistjoni, dan ma jistax jigi rrimedjat bit-tnehhija tal-artikoli tal-Kap. 69 jew tal-Att X tal-2009 jew tal-artikolu 1531C tal-Kap. 16; jew bl-izgumbrament tal-okkupanta. Dan qed jinghad ghaliex ma jkunx jaghmel sens li wiehed jaghraf l-iskop, il-htiega u l-legittimità tal-mizuri msemmija biex imbagħad jinnewtralizzahom billi jagħmilhom inapplikabbli bl-izgumbrament tal-okkupanta.

14. Illi l-artikolu 1531F tal-Kap. 16 jaġhti tifsira ta' min hu l-inkwilin ta' fond residenzjali u meta wieħed jixtarr dan l-artikolu, jirrizulta kemm huwa nfondat l-ilment tar-rikorrenti meta jghidu li m'għandhomx speranza reali li qatt jiksbu lura l-pussess effettiv tal-fond.

15. Xieraq jigi sottolineat li dan l-fond gie mikri bi qbil bejn ir-rikorrenti u l-inkwilina u hadd ma mpona fuq ir-rikorrenti li dan il-fond irid jinkera bil-fors. Ma jirrizulta minn imkien li kien hemm xi theddida imminenti u attwali li sfurzathom li jaġħtu dan il-fond b'kiri (vide Frances Montanaro et vs Avukat Generali et, deciz nhar it-13 ta' April 2018 mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali) u fil-fatt kien hemm diversi toroq li r-rikorrenti setghu jaġhzlu dak iz-zmien, bhal ibighu l-fond jew jikru l-fond bhala fond kummercjal.

16. Salv eccezzjonijiet ulterjuri.

Għaldaqstant, l-esponent jitlob bir-rispett lil din l-Onorabbi Qorti jogħgobha tichad il-pretensjonijiet kif dedotti fir-rikors promotur bhala infondati fil-fatt u fid-dritt stante li r-rikorrenti ma sofrew l-ebda ksur tad-drittijiet tal-bniedem u l-libertajiet fondamentali, u dan bl-ispejjeż kontra l-istess rikorrenti.

Rat id-digriet li tat fl-udjenza tal-10 ta' Settembru 2020 fejn laqghet it-talba tar-rikorrenti ghall-hatra ta' perit tekniku sabiex jistma u jirrelata dwar il-valur lokatizju fis-suq tal-fond Flat 1, Mayfair Flats, Birkirkara Road, San Giljan, ghaz-zmien ta' bejn l-1 ta' Jannar 1965 u kull hames snin sussegwenti sal-10 ta' Settembru 2020. Kien mahtur għal dan l-iskop Perit Mario Cassar.

Rat ir-relazzjoni li pprezenta l-perit tekniku, debitament ikkonfermata minnu bil-gurament.

Semghet ix-xiehda u rat il-provi l-ohra li tressqu fil-kors tal-kawza.

Rat illi l-kawza thalliet ghas-sentenza ghal-lum bil-fakolta` li l-partijiet jipprezentaw noti ta` osservazzjonijiet.

Rat in-noti ta` osservazzjonijiet.

Rat l-atti l-ohra tal-kawza.

II. Provi

1. Xhieda

Ir-rikorrent Raymond Testa xehed illi l-fond kien ilu mikri lill-intimata Fletcher sa minn qabel l-1965. Madwar 25 sena ilu, ir-rikorrenti marru quddiem il-Bord li Jirregola l-Kera sabiex jitolbu zieda fil-kera. Il-Bord cahad it-talba u l-kera baqghet dik ta` Lm 12 fix-xahar. Fi zminijiet aktar recenti huwa tkellem mal-inkwilina u talab zieda fil-kera. L-intimata dehret li kienet lesta thallas sad-doppja tal-kera u cioe` Lm 24 fix-xahar. Huma dehrilhom illi l-ammont kien baxx u ghalhekk ma kienx hemm ftehim.

Giorgia Fletcher xehdet illi kienet ilha tikri l-fond sa mill-1969. Problemi mas-sidien qatt ma kellha ghaliex dejjem kienet puntwali fil-hlas tal-kera u fiz-zamma tal-post. Is-sidien dejjem accettaw il-hlas tal-kera. Kien biss meta marret thallas il-kera fis-16 ta` April 2020 illi dawn irrifjutaw il-hlas u ghalhekk bdiet tiddepozita l-kera l-qorti. Fil-prezent kienet qegħda thallas €94.02 kull tlett xhur.

2. Ir-relazzjoni tal-perit tekniku

Il-perit tekniku ghamel dawn **il-kostatazzjonijiet** :-

- Il-fond jikkonsisti f` mezzanin fil-livell tal-ewwel sular.
- Il-fond jinsab fi triq traffikuza hafna.
- Il-fond għandu daqs komplexiv mibni ta` cirka 65 metri kwadri u bitha ta` cirka 40 metri kwadru.
- Tenut kont tas-sit, id-daqs u l-istat attwali tal-post, il-fond għandu valur fis-suq, jekk liberu u frank, ta` **€150,000**.
- Fl-1965 il-valur lokatizju tal-fond kien ta` **€276** fis-sena.
- Fl-2020 il-valur lokatizju kien ta` **€5,250** fis-sena.

3. Il-piz probatorju ta` relazzjoni teknika

Fis-sentenza tagħha tad-19 ta` Novembru 2001 fil-kawza **"Calleja v. Mifsud"**, il-Qorti tal-Appell qalet hekk -

Kemm il-kostatazzjonijiet tal-perit tekniku nominat mill-Qorti kif ukoll il-konsiderazzjonijiet u opinjonijiet esperti tieghu jikkostitwixxu skond il-ligi prova ta` fatt li kellhom bhala tali jigu meqjusa mill-Qorti. Il-Qorti ma kenitx obbligata li taccetta r-rapport tekniku bhala prova determinanti u kellha dritt li tiskartah kif setghet tiskarta kull prova ohra. Mill-banda l-ohra pero` huwa ritenut minn dawn il-Qrati li kelle jingħata piz debitu lill-fehma teknika tal-espert nominat mill-Qorti billi l-Qorti ma kellhiex leggerment tinjora dik il-prova. Hu manifest illi l-mertu tal-prezenti istanza kien kollu kemm hu wieħed ta` natura teknika li ma setax jigi epurat u deciz mill-Qorti mingħajr l-assistenza ta` espert in materja. B`danakollu dan ma jfissirx illi l-Qorti ma kellhiex thares b`lenti kritika lejn l-opinjoni teknika lilha sottomessa u ma kellhiex tezita li tiskarta dik l-opinjoni jekk din ma tkunx wahda sodisfacientement u adegwatamente tinvesti l-mertu, jew jekk il-konkluzjoni ma kenitx sewwa tirrizolvi l-kwezit ta` natura teknika. (enfasi u sottolinear ta` din il-qorti)

Ghalkemm qorti mhix marbuta li taccetta l-konkluzjonijiet ta` perit tekniku kontra l-konvinzjoni tagħha (*dictum expertorum numquam transit in rem judicata*), fl-istess waqt dak *ma jfissirx pero` illi qorti dan tista` tagħmlu b` mod legger jew kapriccju. Il-konvinzjoni kuntrarja tagħha kellha tkun ben informata u bazata fuq ragunijiet li gravament ipoggu fid-dubju dik l-opinjoni teknika lilha sottomessa b` ragunijiet li ma għandhomx ikunu privi mill-konsiderazzjoni tal-aspett tekniku tal-materja taht ezami (“**Grima vs Mamo et noe**” – Qorti tal-Appell – 29 ta` Mejju 1998).*

Jigifieri qorti ma tistax tinjora r-relazzjoni peritali sakemm ma tkunx konvinta li l-konkluzjoni ta` tali relazzjoni ma kienetx gusta u korretta. Din il-konvinzjoni pero` kellha tkun wahda motivata minn gudizzju ben informat, anke fejn mehtieg mil-lat tekniku. (“**Cauchi vs Mercieca**” – Qorti tal-Appell – 6 ta` Ottubru 1999 ; “**Saliba vs Farrugia**” – Qorti tal-Appell – 28 ta` Jannar 2000 u “**Calleja noe vs Mifsud**” – Qorti tal-Appell – 19 ta` Novembru 2001).

*Il-giudizio dell'arte espress mill-perit tekniku ma jistax u ma għandux, aktar u aktar fejn il-parti nteressata ma tkunx ipprevaliet ruħha mill-fakolta` lilha mogħtija ta` talba għan-nomina ta` periti addizzjonali, jigi skartat facilment, ammenokke` ma jkunx jidher sodisfacientement illi l-konkluzjonijiet peritali huma, fil-kumpless kollha tac-cirkostanzi, irragonevoli” – (“**Bugeja et v. Muscat et**” – Qorti tal-Appell – 23 ta` Gunju 1967).*

Fil-kaz tal-lum, jirrizulta bhala fatt li wara li kienet prezentata u mahlufa r-relazzjoni tal-perit tekniku, il-partijiet ma ressqux talba ghall-hatra ta` periti addizzjonali.

Wara li rat ir-relazzjoni, il-qorti sejra tagħmel tagħha l-kostatazzjonijiet u l-konkluzjonijiet tal-perit tekniku, u sejra tqishom bhala prova ta` fatt flimkien mal-provi l-ohra.

III. L-eccezzjonijiet preliminari

1. L-ewwel (1) eccezzjoni tal-intimat Avukat tal-Istat

Kien eccepit mill-intimat Avukat tal-Istat li r-rikorrenti kellhom jaghmlu l-prova tat-titolu ghall-propjeta` mertu ta` din il-kawza.

Il-gurisprudenza tal-qrati tagħna hija fis-sens illi fil-kawzi ta` ndole kostituzzjonali mhuwiex indispensabbli illi r-rikorrenti jipprova t-titolu tieghu ghall-propjeta` *de qua* ghaliex kawzi bhal din tal-lum mhumiex kawzi ta` rivendika fejn il-prova tat-titolu hija *sine qua non* sabiex tirnexxi l-azzjoni.

Fis-sentenza li tat fis-7 ta` Frar 2017 fil-kawza **Robert Galea v. Avukat Generali et** din il-qorti diversament presjeduta qalet hekk :-

*"Illi biex wiehed ikun f`qaghda li juri li garrab ksur tal-jedd fundamentali tieghu taht l-artikolu 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni m`għandux ghafnejn jipprova titolu assolut u lanqas wieħed originali bħallikieku l-azzjoni dwar ksur ta` jedd fundamentali kienet wahda ta` rivendika (Kost. 27.3.2015 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Ian Peter Ellis et vs Avukat Generali et**). Huwa bizzejjed, ghall-finijiet ta` dak l-artikolu, li wieħed juri li għandu jedd fil-haga li tkun li bih jista` jiegħaf ghall-pretensjonijiet ta` haddiehor.*

Imbagħad, ghall-finijiet tal-artikolu 1 tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni, huwa bizzejjed li l-persuna turi li kellha l-pussess tal-haga li tkun."

Dan premess, il-qorti tghid illi bħala fatt ir-rikorrenti għamlu l-prova tat-titolu tagħhom ghall-fond de quo.

Infatti jirrizulta ppruvat illi :-

- a) B`kuntratt tal-14 ta` Settembru 1961 fl-atti tan-Nutar Dottor Carmelo Giuseppe Vella, Tancred Testa, ossia ir-ragel ta` Giovanna Testa u missier ir-rikorrenti l-ohra ahwa Testa, xtara u akkwista is-subtile dominju perpetwuta` zewg flats immarkati bin-numri wieħed (1) u tnejn (2) fil-blokk illum bl-isem `Mayfair Flats` rispettivament bid-dhul principali tagħhom minn Triq Birkirkara, San Giljan.

b) Fid-29 ta` April 1977, l-eredita` ta` Tancred Testa kienet debitament denunzjata u thallsu t-taxxi relativi inkluz fuq il-flat in kwistjoni.

Dawn il-provi ma gewx kontestati.

Wara li rat l-atti, il-qorti hija sodisfatta li r-rikorrenti għandhom titolu tajjeb ghall-propjjeta` sabiex jipproponu l-kawza odjerna.

Billi t-titolu tar-rikorrenti jirrizulta ppruvat, sejra tastjeni milli tiehu konjizzjoni ulterjuri tal-ewwel (1) eccezzjoni tal-intimat Avukat tal-Istat.

2. L-ewwel (1) eccezzjoni tal-intimata Fletcher

Qed ikun eccepit illi l-intimata Fletcher mhijiex il-legittimu kontradittur tar-rikorrenti fil-kawza odjerna billi huwa biss l-Istat (mhux hi) li jista` jikkommetti vjolazzjoni tad-drittijiet fondamentali.

Huwa accettat mill-gurisprudenza tagħna illi f`kawzi ta` indole kostituzzjonali u/jew konvenzjonali huwa l-Istat illi għandu jwiegeb ghall-vjolazzjoni ta` drittijiet fondamentali billi huwa l-Istat illi għandu l-obbligu illi jassigura illi l-ligijiet ma joholqu zbilanc ngust bejn id-drittijiet tac-cittadin privat u l-obbligi tal-Istat.

Fil-kawza tal-lum, ir-rikorrenti qegħdin jilmentaw mill-fatt illi d-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 qegħdin joholqu relazzjoni forzuza għad-detriment tagħhom vis-à-vis l-intimata Fletcher bhala inkwilina tagħhom. Għalhekk qegħdin jitkolu dikjarazzjoni illi d-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 (bl-emendi li saru bl-Att X tal-2009) jiksru l-jeddiġiet fondamentali tagħhom skont l-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni u l-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni.

Fis-sentenza li tat fis-7 ta` Dicembru 1990 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Joseph Abela v. Onor. Prim` Ministru et**, il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali qalet hekk :-

"F`kawzi ta` natura kostituzzjonalibb azati fuq id-drittijiet fundamentali, il-legittimi kontraditturi ta` dawk l-azzjonijiet jinqasmu fi tliet kategoriji. L-ewwel kategorija tikkomprendi dak li huwa allegat li huma, direttament jew indirittament, responsabli għall-kummissjoni jew omissjoni ta` xi fatt li jikser xi dritt fundamentali protett mil-ligi. Fit-tieni kategorija huma dawk li għall-omissionijiet jew kummissionijiet tal-persuni tal-ewwel kategorija jistgħu jkunu responsabli biex jaġtu jew jiffornixxu r-rimedji li s-sentenza, li takkolji llament tal-ksur ta` dritt fundamentali, tissanzjona. It-tielet kategorija mbagħad hemm dawk il-partijiet kollha li jkunu in kawza meta l-kwistjoni kostituzzjonalib tingala` fuq jew waqt xi procedura gudizzjarja.

Dawn it-tliet kategoriji ta` persuni huma kollha legittimi kontraditturi fi proceduri ta` natura kostituzzjonalib, li f'dan ir-rigward ukoll hija specjali, għaliex biex zgħumbrament ikunu kompeti u effikaci jirrikjedu l-prezenza ta` persuni li normalment fi procedure ordinarji jithallew barra, għaliex mingħajrhom il-gudizzju xorta wahda huwa integrū. F'azzjoni ta` natura kostituzzjonalib wkoll, il-gudizzju jkunu integrū, jekk il-persuni tat-tieni kategorija jithallew barra mill-kawza, ghalkemm jista` jkun li l-azzjoni tirrizulta ineffikaci."

Fil-procediment tal-lum, l-Avukat tal-Istat huma r-rappresentant tal-Istat. Jekk ir-rikorrenti jsehhilhom jipprova l-allegat ksur tad-drittijiet fondamentali tagħhom, u bhala rimedju jingħataw kumpens (kemm jekk pekunarju kif ukoll jekk morali) huwa l-Istat illi għandu jagħmel tajjeb għall-hlas tal-kumpens.

Fil-kaz tal-intimata Fletcher, il-lezjoni lamentata mir-rikorrenti fil-kawza odjerna mhijiex diretta kontra tagħha. Fl-istess waqt tajjeb jingħad illi l-intimata Fletcher kienet imħarrka billi għandha interess fl-esitu tal-procediment. Proceduri tax-xorta tal-lum jinvolvu zewg aspetti : i) ir-responsabilità` għall-vjolazzjoni ; u ii) l-persuna li trid twiegeb. Dawn iz-zewg aspetti mhux necessarjament ikunu konnessi tant illi waqt li l-vjolazzjoni tkun giet imwettqa minn persuna, irrimedju jista` jolqot persuna ohra.

Fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Raymond Cassar Torreggiani et v. Avukat Generali et**, deciza mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonal fit-22 ta` Frar 2013, il-qorti għamlet din l-osservazzjoni :-

"... **biex gudizzju jkun integrar jehtieg li, ghall-ahjar gudizzju tal-Qorti, jippartecipaw fih dawk kollha li huma nteressati fil-kawza**. B`hekk tigi assigurata kemm jista` jkun l-effikacita` tal-gudizzju inkwantu dan jorbot biss lil dawk li jkunu partecipi fih, kif ukoll jigi rispettat il-principju tal-ekonomija tal-gudizzju sabiex ma jkunx hemm bzonn ta` ripetizzjoni ta` proceduri kontra l-persuni kollha interessati fid-diversi kawzi billi dawn ma jkunux hadu parti f`gudizzju wiehed. Il-gudizzju jibqa` integrar mill-mument li jiehdu parti fih dawk li jkollhom id-dritt, u dawk li kontra tagħhom dak l-istess dritt jikkompeti". (enfasi mizjuda)

Mill-premess għandu jirrizulta car li l-intimati konjugi Tabone, bhala inkwilini tal-fond de quo, u tenut kont tal-fatt li propriu l-inkwilinat tagħhom jifforma l-mertu tal-kawza odjerna, għandhom interess guridiku u għalhekk ikunu partecipi fil-kawza li jista` jkollha effetti legali anke fuqhom."

Il-qorti tagħmel referenza wkoll għal dak illi nghad fis-sentenza li tat il-Qorti Kostituzzjonal fis-6 ta` Frar 2015 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Sam Bradshaw et v. I-Avukat Generali et** :-

"20. Din il-Qorti tosserva li, ghalkemm taqbel mat-tezi li, ladarba l-kazin agixxa skont il-ligi, allura m'ghandux legalment jirrispondi għall-inkostituzzjonalita` tal-ligi applikata minnu jew jehel spejjez tal-kawza, izda mill-banda l-ohra, il-proceduri odjerni necessarjament jaffettwaw lill-kazin stante li dan hu parti fir-rapport guridiku li huwa regolat b`ligi li l-kostituzzjonalita` tagħha qed tigi attakkata. Għaldaqstant il-prezenza tieghu f`dawn il-proceduri hija necessarja għall-finijiet tal-integreta` tal-gudizzju. Il-kazin bhala inkwilin tal-fond għandu interess guridiku f`din il-kawza peress li l-meritu jikkoncerna lilu direttament. Għal din ir-raguni huwa għandu jkun partcipi fil-gudizzju u għalhekk huma legittimi kuntraditturi. Għaldaqstant lewwel Qorti kienet korretta meta laqghet it-talba qhas-sejha fil-kawza tal-kazin intimat."

Ir-rikorrenti qeghdin jitolbu l-izgumbrament tal-intimata Fletcher. L-effett ta` dak li qed jintalab mir-rikorrenti jolqot lill-intimata Fletcher **direttamente**; qhalhekk qandha l-interess li trid il-

ligi sabiex tiddefendi l-pozizzjoni tagħha. Għandha tkun parti fil-kawza, anke jekk finalment il-legittimita` tagħha tkun tirrizulta bhala passiva.

L-ewwel (1) eccezzjoni tal-intimata Fletcher qegħda tigi respinta.

IV. It-talbiet u l-eccezzjonijiet fil-mertu

1. L-ewwel (1) talba

It-titolu ta` kera tal-intimata Fletcher kien ippruvat.

L-ewwel (1) talba mhixex kontestata.

Għalhekk qegħda tkun milqugha.

2. It-tieni (2) talba

a) L-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni

Safejn fit-tieni talba r-rikkorrenti talbu dikjarazzjoni mill-qorti li garrbu vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tagħhom kif dawn huma mharsa bl-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni ta` Malta ("**il-Kostituzzjoni**") I-Avukat tal-Istat ressaq ir-raba` (4) eccezzjoni fejn taht il-paragrafu (a) eccepixxa li skont l-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni, l-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni m`ghandux jimpatta fuq it-thaddim tad-dispozizzjonijiet tal-Kap. 69. Imbagħad fil-paragrafu (b), I-Avukat tal-Istat jeccepixxi li l-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni jsib applikazzjoni biss fil-kaz ta` tehid foruz.

L-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni jaqra hekk :

"Ebda haga fl-artikolu 37 ta` din il-Kostituzzjoni ma għandha tolqot il-hdim ta` xi ligi fis-sehh minnufih qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962 jew xi ligi magħmula fi jew wara dik id-data li

temenda jew tissostitwixxi xi ligi fis-sehh minnufih qabel dik id-data (jew xi ligi li, minn zmien ghal zmien, tkun emendata jew sostitwita bil-mod deskrift f`dan is-subartikolu) u li ma -

(a) izzidx max-xorta ta` proprietà li jista` jittiehed pussess tagħha jew id-drittijiet fuq u interess fi proprietà li jistgħu jigu miksuba;

(b) izzidx mal-finijiet li ghalihom jew cirkostanzi li fihom dik il-proprietà jista` jittiehed pussess tagħha jew tigi miksuba;

(c) tagħmilx il-kondizzjonijiet li jirregolaw id-dritt għal kumpens jew l-ammont tiegħu anqas favorevoli lil xi persuna li jkollha jew li tkun interessata fil-proprietà; jew

(d) tipprivax xi persuna minn xi dritt bħal dak li huw amsemmi fil-paragrafu (b) jew paragrafu (c) tal-artikolu 37(1) ta` din il-Kostituzzjoni."

Fil-kaz tal-lum il-kirja favur I-intimata Fletcher hija regolata bil-Kap 69 liema ligi saret qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962 u allura kienet saved bl-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni.

Il-qorti rat il-gurisprudenza dwar I-Art 37 u I-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni fil-kuntest tal-Kap 88 billi dik il-gurisprudenza ssib applikazzjoni *mutatis mutandis* ghall-kaz tal-Kap 69.

Fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Lawrence Fenech Limited v. Kummissarju tal-Artijiet et** deciza mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fid-9 ta` Novembru 2012 tressaq aggravju fis-sens li I-Ewwel Qorti ma setghetx issib ksur tal-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni minhabba I-Art 47(9). L-aggravju kien milqugh propju ghaliex il-Kap 88 sar ligi tal-pajjiz qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962.

Fis-sentenza ta` din il-qorti tal-4 ta` Ottubru 2016 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Melina Micallef v. Il-Kummissarju tal-Artijiet** (hekk kif riformata mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fl-24 ta` Novembru 2017) kien riaffermat illi *d-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 88 kienu saved bl-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni u għalhekk ma tistax tigi nvokata vjolazzjoni tal-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni.*

Similment fis-sentenza ta` din il-qorti tat-3 ta` Ottubru 2014 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Francis Bezzina Wettinger et vs Kummissarju tal-Artijiet et** (konfermata mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fl-24 ta` April 2015) inghad hekk :-

"L-intimati jikkontendu li I-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni mhuwiex applikabbi għall-kaz tal-lum in vista tal-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni.

Il-Qorti terga` tagħmel riferenza għas-sentenza tal-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fil-kawza "Bezzina Wettinger et vs Il-Prim` Ministru et" (op. cit.)

Fis-sentenza tagħha, il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali kkonfermat dak li qalet I-Ewwel Qorti :-

Illi għalhekk din il-Qorti taqbel mal-konkluzjoni tal-Ewwel Qorti illi I-Kapitolu 88 – bhala ligi li kienet fis-sehh qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962 – huwa salvagwardjat bl-istess Kostituzzjoni ai termini tal-Artikolu 47(9), u konsegwentement dan I-aggravju qed jigi respint.

*Illi dwar dan il-punt, din il-Qorti tagħmel riferenza wkoll għas-sentenza ta` din il-Qorti (PA/RCP) tat-22 ta` Marzu 2002 fil-kawza "**Francis Bezzina Wettinger et vs Kummissarju tal-Artijiet**" fejn inghad hekk :-*

*Illi kif ingħad f`**Pawl Cachia vs Avukat Generali et** (9/4/99 Rik. Nru. 586/97/VDG), il-hdim ta` xi ligi fis-sehh minnufih qabel id-data msemmija ma tistax tkun anti-kostituzzjonali fis-sens li tippekka kontra l-artikolu 37. L-istess jingħad għal xi amending act jew substituting act magħmula f`dik id-data jew wara dik id-data purche` li tali att li hekk jemenda jew jissostitwixxi dik il-ligi ma jkunx jagħmel xi wahda mill-affarijiet imsemmi fil-paragrafi (a) sa (d) tal-imsemmi artikolu 47(9).*

Illi kif kompliet tghid dik il-Qorti, ma hemmx dubbju li I-Kap. 88 kien fis-sehh qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962. Ma hemmx dubju wkoll li l-imsemmija ligi giet emendata wara dik id-data, izda r-rikorrent f`ebda hin ma ndika xi emenda li b`xi mod taqa` taht xi wieħed mill-paragrafi (a) sa (d) tal-artikolu 47(9). Illi hafna mill-emendi magħmula wara t-3 ta` Marzu 1962 kienu ta` natura formali bhas-sostituzzjoni tal-Gvernatur Generali

bil-President ta' Malta. Illi din il-Qorti b`hekk ezaminat jekk fir-rigward tad-dikjarazzjonijiet ta' esproprjazzjoni meritu ta` din il-kawza u fir-rigward tal-proceduri ghall-kumpens gewx imhaddma xi amending provisions li jaqghu taht l-imsemmija paragrafi (a) sa (d). Din il-Qorti ma tarax li dan huwa l-kaz, fis-sens li d-dispozizzjonijiet imhaddma fir-rigward tal-ordnijiet ta' esproprjazzjoni de quo huma kollha salvati bl-Artikolu 47(9) milli jiksru l-Artikolu 37.

Issa l-Qorti tirribadixxi li fil-kawza tal-lum, ir-rikorrenti qeghdin jilmentaw minn vjolazzjoni tal-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni ghaliex il-Bord tal-Arbitragg dwar l-Artijiet illikwida kumpens li, skond ir-rikorrenti, ma kienx xieraq u adegwat.

Il-Qorti tirrileva li l-kumpens li l-Bord kien u ghadu jillikwida jsegwi l-kriterji li huma stabbiliti fid-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 88. Ghalhekk billi l-Kap 88 huwa ligi li giet saved ai termini tal-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni, din l-Qorti mhijiex sejra tqis ix-xorta ta` ilment li għandhom ir-rikorrenti skond l-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni fejn dan l-ilment jolqot it-twettieq tal-Kap 88."

Il-Kap 69 sar qabel it-3 ta` Marzu 1962. Għalhekk l-Ordinanza kienet saved bl-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni. Ghalkemm wara t-3 ta` Marzu 1962, saru emendi ghall-Kap 69, is-saving clause tghodd ukoll għal dawk l-emendi. Ghall-fini ta` kompletezza, b`referenza ghall-fattispeci tal-kaz tal-lum, il-qorti m`għandhiex prova li saru emendi ghall-Kap 69 li jaqghu taht xi wahda mill-eccezzjonijiet ravvivati fil-paragrafi (a) sa (d) tal-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni. Tghid dan ghaliex bl-introduzzjoni tal-Artikolu 1531B il-legislatur għamilha cara illi għal kirja li kienet fis-sehh qabel l-1 ta` Gunju 1995 għandha tibqa` tghodd il-ligi kif kienet fis-sehh qabel l-1 ta` Gunju 1995. Madanakollu bl-emendi li saru u dahlu fis-sehh bis-sahha tal-Att X tal-2009 il-legislatur haseb illi jipprovd iċċetta ta` zidiet fil-quantum tal-kera waqt li gie ffissat ammont bhala l-anqas rata ta` kera permissibbli. Zgur għalhekk illi bl-introduzzjoni ta` dawn l-emendi il-legislatur ma poggiex fis-sehh kondizzjonijiet li jirregolaw id-dritt għal kumpens b`mod anqas favorevoli għas-sidien. Ma tirrizultax għalhekk l-eccezzjoni ravvivata taht il-paragrafu (c) tal-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni. Lanqas ma jista` jingħad illi l-emendi ntrodotti bl-Att X tal-2009 jaqghu taht l-eccezzjoni mahsuba fil-paragrafu (b) tal-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni ghaliex l-Art 1531F jagħmel elenku specifiku tal-persuni li f`determinati cirkostanzi tista` tigi tramanda l-kirja favur tagħhom. Għalhekk mhux talli dawn l-emendi ma jzidux mal-finijiet jew cirkostanzi li fihom jista` jinkiseb lura l-pussess battal tal-

proprjeta` talli jservu sabiex jistabilixxu *cut off date* u determinati cirkostanzi li tahthom biss tista` tigi mgedda l-kirja favur qraba tal-inkwilin. Jekk l-inkwilin ma jkollux jghixu mieghu persuni li jissoddisfaw il-kriterji partikolari ndikati fl-Artikolu 1531F, is-sid jaf b`certezza li mal-mewt tal-inkwilin huwa sejjer jikseb lura l-pusess battal. Il-qorti hija tal-fehma illi l-emendi introdotti bl-Att X tal-2009 ma jzidux aktar piz fuq is-sidien ma` dak li kien diga` mpost bil-Kap 69.

Il-qorti terga` tishaq illi d-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 kienu saved bl-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni. Ghalhekk ma tistax tigi avvanzata mir-rikorrenti pretensjoni ta` vjolazzjoni tal-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni.

Fic-cirkostanzi ma hemmx il-htiega li tistharreg l-eccezzjoni sollevata taht il-paragrafu (b) tal-eccezzjoni numru erbgħha (4) kif tressqet mill-Avukat tal-Istat.

It-tieni (2) talba limitatament u safejn tirreferi għal vjolazzjoni tal-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni qegħda tkun respinta.

b) L-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzioni

Id-disposizzjoni taqra hekk :-

Kull persuna naturali jew persuna morali għandha d-dritt għat-tgawdija pacifika tal-possedimenti tagħha.

Hadd ma għandu jigi pprivat mill-possedimenti tieghu hliel fl-interess pubbliku u bla hsara tal-kundizzjonijiet provduti bil-ligi u bil-principji generali tal-ligi internazzjonali.

Izda d-disposizzjoni ta` qabel ma għandhom b`ebda mod inaqqsu d-dritt ta` Stat li jwettaq dawk il-ligijiet li jidhrulu xierqa biex jikkontrolla l-uzu tal-proprieta skond l-interess generali jew biex jizgura l-hlas ta` taxxi jew kontribuzzjonijiet ohra jew pieni.

Id-disposizzjoni hija gwidata minn tliet principji :-

a) Illi kull persuna, sew dik naturali kif ukoll dik morali, għandha dritt għat-tgawdija tal-proprjeta` b`mod pacifiku.

b) Illi tnaqqis fit-tgawdija tal-proprjeta` jista` jkun biss gustifikat jekk jintwera li jkun sar fl-interess pubbliku. Għalhekk id-dritt mhuwiex assolut u huwa soggett ghall-kundizzjonijiet mahsuba fil-ligi u ghall-principji tad-dritt internazzjonali. Min ikun imcahhad, huwa ntitolat għal kumpens xieraq.

c) Illi jibqa` d-dritt tal-Istat illi jghaddi ligijiet sabiex *inter alia* b`mod xieraq jikkontrolla l-uzu tal-gid fl-interess pubbliku, bhal meta jintrosudi legislazzjoni ntiza sabiex ittaffi problemi ta` akkomodazzjoni.

i) **Gurisprudenza tal-ECtHR**

L-Istat għandu s-setgha u d-dritt li jirregola l-uzu tal-propjeta` fl-interess generali. Madanakollu l-interess tal-privat għandu jkun tutelat ukoll ghaliex fl-ezercizzju tas-setgha tal-Istat li jikkontrolla l-uzu tal-proprietà għandu jkun sodisfatt ir-rekwizit tal-proporzjonalità.

Fis-sentenza **Amato Gauci v. Malta** (15 ta` Settembru 2009 : finali 15 ta` Dicembru 2009) l-ECtHR kienet qalet :-

56. *Any interference with property must also satisfy the requirement of proportionality. As the Court has repeatedly stated, a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights, the search for such a fair balance being inherent in the whole of the Convention. The requisite balance will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see **Sporrong and Lönnroth** cited above, §§ 69-74, and **Brumărescu v. Romania** [GC], no. 28342/95, § 78, ECHR 1999-VII).*

57. *The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a whole. In each case involving an alleged violation of that Article the Court must therefore ascertain whether by reason of the State's interference the person concerned had to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden (see **James and***

Others, cited above, § 50; **Mellacher and Others**, cited above, § 48, and **Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy**, judgment of 28 September 1995, § 33, Series A no. 315-B).

58. In assessing compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must make an overall examination of the various interests in issue, bearing in mind that the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are "practical and effective". It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. Indeed, where an issue in the general interest is at stake, it is incumbent on the public authorities to act in good time, and in an appropriate and consistent manner (see **Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy**, [GC], no. 22774/93, § 54, ECHR 1999-V; and Broniowski, cited above, § 151).

59. Moreover, in situations where the operation of the rent-control legislation involves wide-reaching consequences for numerous individuals and has economic and social consequences for the country as a whole, the authorities must have considerable discretion not only in choosing the form and deciding on the extent of control over the use of property but also in deciding on the appropriate timing for the enforcement of the relevant laws. Nevertheless, that discretion, however considerable, is not unlimited and its exercise cannot entail consequences at variance with the Convention standards (see, mutatis mutandis, **Hutten-Czapska**, cited above, § 223)."

...

"In the present case, having regard to the low rental value which could be fixed by the Rent Regulation Board, the applicant's state of uncertainty as to whether he would ever recover his property, which has already been subject to this regime for nine years, the lack of procedural safeguards in the application of the law and the rise in the standard of living in Malta over the past decades, the Court finds that a disproportionate and excessive burden was imposed on the applicant. The latter was requested to bear most of the social and financial costs of supplying housing accommodation to Mr and Mrs P. (see, mutatis mutandis, **Hutten-Czapska**, cited above, § 225). It follows that the Maltese State failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the applicant's right of property.

Ta` rilevanza kien il-pronunzjament tal-ECtHR fil-kaz ta` **Cassar v. Malta** deciz fit-30 ta` Jannar 2018 fejn inghad :-

43. *The Court reiterates that in order for an interference to be compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 it must be lawful, be in the general interest and be proportionate, that is to say it must strike a "fair balance" between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see, among many other authorities, **Beyeler v. Italy** [GC], no. 33202/96, § 107, ECHR 2000-I, and **J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom** [GC], no. 44302/02, § 75, ECHR 2007-III). The Court will examine these requirements in turn.*

(a) Whether there was an interference

44. *In connection with the development of property, the Court has previously found that having been aware of the fact that their property had been encumbered with restrictions when they had bought it (for example, its designation in a local development plan), the applicants could not hold that circumstance against the authorities (see **Lacz v. Poland**, (dec.) no. 22665/02, 23 June, 2009; and the case-law cited therein), specially when a complaint has not been made that they had a legitimate reason to believe that the restrictions encumbering their property would be removed after they bought the property. However, the Court has not excluded that there might be particular cases where an applicant who bought a property in full knowledge that it was encumbered with restrictions may subsequently complain of an interference with his or her property rights, for example, where the said restrictions are alleged to be unlawful (ibid.).*

45. *More specifically in the context of restrictions on lease agreements (in particular the prohibition on bringing a tenant's lease to an end), the Court has found that there was an interference as a result of the domestic courts' refusals of the applicants' demands, despite the applicants' knowledge of the applicable restrictions when they had entered into the lease agreement, a matter which however*

carried decisive weight in the assessment of the proportionality of the measure (see **Almeida Ferreira and Melo Ferreira v. Portugal**, no. 41696/07, §§ 27 and 34, 21 December 2010).

46. Subsequently, in **R & L, s.r.o. and Others** (cited above) the Court specifically examined whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protected applicants who had purchased property in the knowledge that rent restrictions imposed on the property might contravene the Convention. In that case, when the applicants had acquired their respective properties their rents had been set in accordance with the rent regulations applicable at the time and the applicants could not have increased the rents above the threshold set by the State. Nor were they free to terminate the rent agreements and conclude new ones with different – higher – levels of rent. The Court did not find it decisive that one of the applicants had purchased the property before the domestic courts had taken issue with the legislation in place which had given a legitimate expectation that the status of such properties would be addressed by the national legislator in due course. The Court held that it could not be said that the applicants as landlords had implicitly waived their right to set the level of rents, as, for the Court, waiving a right necessarily presupposed that it would have been possible to exercise it. There was no waiver of a right in a situation where the person concerned had never had the option of exercising that right and thus could not waive it. It followed that the rent-control regulations had constituted an interference with the landlords' right to use their property (*ibid.*, § 106).

47. In the more recent **Zammit and Attard Cassar** (cited above, § 50) case, in a situation where the applicants' predecessor in title had knowingly entered into a rent agreement in 1971 with relevant restrictions (specifically the inability to increase rent or to terminate the lease), the Court held that, at the time, the applicants' predecessor in title could not reasonably have had a clear idea of the extent of inflation in property prices in the decades to follow. Moreover, the Court observed that when the applicants had inherited the property in question they had been unable to do anything more than attempt to use the available remedies, which had been to no avail in their circumstances. The decisions of the domestic courts regarding their request had thus constituted interference in their respect. Furthermore,

as in ***R & L, s.r.o. and Others***, in ***Zammit and Attard Cassar*** (both cited above) the applicants, who had inherited a property that had already been subject to a lease, had not had the possibility to set the rent themselves (or to freely terminate the agreement). It followed that they could not be said to have waived any rights in that respect. Accordingly, the Court found that the rent-control regulations and their application in that case had constituted an interference with the applicants' right (as landlords) to use their property (***Zammit and Attard Cassar***, cited above, § 51).

48. Turning to the present case, the Court also notes that the applicants had bought their property before the European Court of Human Rights took issue with the Maltese legislation applicable in cases such as ***Amato Gauci*** (cited above). That judgment was eventually followed in most cases in domestic case-law. However, again the Court finds this not to be decisive given the passage of time between the purchase of the property and now. In this connection the Court reiterates that what might be justified at a specific time might not be justified decades later (see ***Amato Gauci***, cited above, § 60). In the present case, while it is true that the applicants knowingly entered into the rent agreement in 1988 with the relevant restrictions (specifically the inability to increase the rent or to terminate the lease), the Court considers that the applicants could not reasonably have foreseen the extent of inflation in property prices in the decades that followed (see ***Zammit and Attard Cassar***, cited above, § 50). Once the discrepancy in the rent applied and that on the market became evident, they were unable to do anything more than attempt to use the available remedies, which they did in 2010, but which were to no avail in their circumstances. The decisions of the domestic courts regarding their application thus constituted interference in their respect. Furthermore, the applicants, who bought a property that was already subject to a restricted lease, did not have the possibility to set the rent themselves or to freely terminate the agreement. Clearly, they could not be said to have waived any rights in that connection (see ***Zammit and Attard Cassar***, cited above, § 50).

49. Accordingly, the Court finds that the rent-control regulations and their application in the present case constituted an interference with the applicants' right (as landlords) to use their property (see ***Zammit and Attard Cassar***, cited above, § 51). Nevertheless, in circumstances

such as those of the present case a number of considerations need to be made in connection with the proportionality of the interference.

50. *The Court has previously held that rent-control schemes and restrictions on an applicant's right to terminate a tenant's lease constitute control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It follows that the case should be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see **Hutten-Czapska v. Poland** [GC], no. 35014/97, §§ 160-61, ECHR 2006-VIII; **Bittó and Others v. Slovakia**, no. 30255/09, § 101, 28 January 2014; and **R & L, s.r.o. and Others**, cited above, § 108).*

(b) **Whether the Maltese authorities observed the principle of lawfulness and pursued a "legitimate aim in the general interest"**

51. *The Court refers to its general principles on the matter as set out in Amato Gauci (cited above, § 53-54).*

52. *That the interference was lawful has not been disputed by the parties. The Court finds that the restriction arising from the 1979 amendments was imposed by Act XXIII of 1979 and was therefore "lawful" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.*

53. *In the present case the Court can accept that the applicable legislation in the present case pursued a legitimate social-policy aim, specifically the social protection of tenants (see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 55, and Anthony Aquilina, cited above, § 57). It is, however, also true that the relevance of that general interest may have decreased over time, particularly after 2008 (see Anthony Aquilina, cited above, § 57), even more so given that following that date, the only person benefiting from the impugned measures was P.G., whose financial situation as shown before the domestic courts and which is not being contested before this Court, leaves little doubt as to P.G.'s necessity for such a property, and at a regulated rent. This Court will therefore revert to this matter in its assessment as to the proportionality of the impugned measure.*

(c) Whether the Maltese authorities struck a fair balance

54. The Court refers to its general principles on the matter as set out in *Amato Gauci* (cited above, § 56-59).

55. The Court will consider the impact that the application of the 1979 Act had on the applicants' property. It notes that the applicants could not exercise their right of use in terms of physical possession as the house was occupied by tenants and they could not terminate the lease. Thus, while the applicants remained the owners of the property they were subjected to a forced landlord-tenant relationship for an indefinite period of time.

56. Despite any reference to unidentified procedural safeguards by the Government (see paragraph 41 above) the Court has on various occasions found that applicants in such a situation did not have an effective remedy enabling them to evict the tenants either on the basis of their own needs or those of their relatives, or on the basis that the tenants were not deserving of such protection (see *Amato Gauci*, cited above, § 60, and *Anthony Aquilina*, cited above, § 66). Indeed, when their need arose (some years after they had purchased it) and later despite the little need of it by the tenant – who was not in any particular need of housing (at least after 2008) – the applicants were unable to recover the property. Consequently, the application of the law itself lacked adequate procedural safeguards aimed at achieving a balance between the interests of the tenants and those of the owners (see *Anthony Aquilina*, cited above, § 66, and mutatis mutandis, *Zammit and Attard Cassar*, cited above, § 61). The Court further considers that the possibility of the tenant leaving the premises voluntarily was remote, especially since the tenancy could be inherited – as in fact happened in the present case. It is clear that these circumstances inevitably left the applicants in uncertainty as to whether they would ever be able to recover their property.

57. As to the rent payable, the Court is ready to accept that EUR 466 annually was a more or less reasonable amount of rent in 1988 - particularly given that it was an amount of rent which the applicants were aware of and in spite of which they decided to purchase the property with the relevant

*restrictions. Furthermore, it was an amount of rent which the applicants expected to receive for a number of years, at least until the demise of J.G. and his wife. Moreover, the Court accepts that at the relevant time the measure pursued a legitimate social-policy aim (see paragraph 53 above) which may call for payments of rent at less than the full market value (see **Amato Gauci**, § 77).*

58. *The same cannot be said after the passage of decades, during which the rent had remained the same (as stated by the parties and the domestic courts, the rent is still EUR 466 annually). The Court has previously held that there had been a rise in the standard of living in Malta over the past decades (see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 63, and **Anthony Aquilina**, cited above, § 65). Thus, the needs and the general interest which may have existed in 1979 must have decreased over the three decades that ensued (see **Anthony Aquilina**, cited above, § 65). It is noted that as stated by the Government in paragraph 40 above, the minimum wage in 2015 was EUR 720.46 per month, while in 1974 (the date when Malta adopted a national minimum wage) it amounted to the equivalent of less than EUR 100 per month (see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 60).*

59. *The Court need not identify the exact year at which the rent payable was no longer reasonable. It observes that cases against Malta concerning the same subject matter, that is to say renewal of leases by operation of law - whose rent had been set on an open market - (see **Amato Gauci, Anthony Aquilina, and Zammit and Attard Cassar**, all cited above), which have invariably lead to findings of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, concerned periods after the year 2000. Furthermore, the Government of the respondent State have often argued that Malta suffered a boom in property prices in 2003 (see, for example, **Apap Bologna v. Malta**, no. 46931/12, § 97, 30 August 2016). Lastly, although not determinative, it was only in 2008 that the applicants refused to accept the rent, once P.G. had inherited the property. In the light of the above it suffices for the Court to consider that a rent based on the value of the property as it stood in 1962 with the relevant adjustment which amounted to EUR 466 annually in 1988 and thereafter – was certainly not reasonable for the years following 2000.*

60. *In particular, even if one had to concede that the valuations submitted by the applicants are on the high side,*

*the Court notes that the first-instance domestic court, in 2011, accepted EUR 3,000 per month (that is to say EUR 36,000 per year) as the rental market value of the property (see paragraph 18 above). Thus, the amount of rent received by the applicants, around EUR 39 a month, that is to say EUR 466 per year, for a fourteen-room house in Sliema, a highly sought-after location, is indeed "derisory" as was also found by the first-instance domestic court (see paragraph 18 above). Indeed, that amount of rent contrasts sharply with the market value of the premises in recent years, as accepted by the domestic court or as submitted by the applicant, as it amounted to a little more than 1% of the market value. The Court considers that State control over levels of rent falls into a sphere subject to a wide margin of appreciation by the State and its application may often cause significant reductions in the amount of rent chargeable. Nevertheless, this may not lead to results which are manifestly unreasonable (see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 62).*

61. In the present case, having regard to the low rental payments to which the applicants have been entitled in recent years, the applicants' state of uncertainty as to whether they would ever recover their property, which has already been subject to this regime for nearly three decades, the rise in the standard of living in Malta over the past decades, and the lack of procedural safeguards in the application of the law, which is particularly conspicuous in the present case given the situation of the current tenant as well as the size of the property and the needs of the applicants, the Court finds that a disproportionate and excessive burden was imposed on the applicants. It follows that the Maltese State failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the applicants' right of property.

62. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

Kaz iehor ta` interess kien dak ta` **Zammit and Attard Cassar v. Malta** li kien deciz mill-ECtHR fit-30 ta` Lulju 2015.

L-ilment tal-applikanti kien illi r-restrizzjonijiet dwar kera kienu ta` piz eccessiv. Kien allegat ghalhekk mill-applikanti li garbu vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tagħhom hekk kif tutelati bl-Art 1

Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni. Il-kaz kien jittratta dwar kirja ta` fond kummercjali li kienet qed tigi mgedda *ope legis* u cioe` bis-sahha tal-Kap 69. Ghalkemm tal-lum huwa kaz ta` fond residenzjali, il-principji jghoddu xorta. L-ECtHR sabet li kien hemm lezjoni tal-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni minkejja l-emendi tal-Att X tal-2009.

Inghad hekk :-

47. *The Court reiterates that in order for an interference to be compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 it must be lawful, be in the general interest and be proportionate, that is, it must strike a "fair balance" between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see, among many other authorities, **Beyeler v. Italy** [GC], no. 33202/96, § 107, ECHR 2000-I, and **J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom** [GC], no. 44302/02, § 75, ECHR 2007-III). The Court will examine these requirements in turn.*

(a) Whether there was interference

48. *In previous cases concerning restrictions on lease agreements, the Court considered that there had been interference (as a result of the domestic courts' refusals of the applicants' demands) despite the applicants' knowledge of the applicable restrictions at the time when they entered into the lease agreement, a matter which however carried weight in the assessment of the proportionality of the measure (see **Almeida Ferreira and Melo Ferreira v. Portugal**, no. 41696/07, §§ 27 and 34, 21 December 2010).*

49. *More recently, in **R & L, s.r.o. and Others v. the Czech Republic** (nos. 37926/05, 25784/09, 36002/09, 44410/09 and 65546/09, 3 July 2014) the Court specifically examined whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protected applicants who had purchased property in the knowledge that rent restrictions imposed on the property might contravene the Convention. In that case, when the applicants had acquired their respective houses their rents had been set in accordance with the rent regulations applicable at the time and the applicants could not have increased the rents above*

the threshold set by the State. Nor were they free to terminate the rent agreements and conclude new ones with different – higher – levels of rent. The Court held that it could not be said that the applicants as landlords had implicitly waived their right to set the level of rents, as, for the Court, waiving a right necessarily presupposed that it would have been possible to exercise it. There was no waiver of a right in a situation where the person concerned had never had the option of exercising that right and thus could not waive it. It followed that the rent-control regulations had constituted an interference with the landlords' right to use their property (ibid. § 106).

50. *In the present case the Court observes that the applicants' predecessor in title knowingly entered into the rent agreement in 1971. It is the Court's considered opinion that, at the time, the applicants' predecessor in title could not reasonably have had a clear idea of the extent of inflation in property prices in the decades to come. Moreover, the Court observes that when the applicants inherited the property in question they had been unable to do anything more than attempt to use the available remedies, which were to no avail in their circumstances. The decisions of the domestic courts regarding their request thus constitute interference in their respect. Furthermore, as in **R & L, s.r.o. and Others** (cited above), the applicants in the present case, who inherited a property that was already subject to a lease, did not have the possibility to set the rent themselves (or to freely terminate the agreement). It follows that they could not be said to have waived any right in that respect.*

51. *Accordingly, the Court considers that the rent-control regulations and their application in the present case constituted an interference with the applicants' right (as landlords) to use their property.*

52. *The Court has previously held that rent-control schemes and restrictions on an applicant's right to terminate a tenant's lease constitute control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It follows that the case should be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see **Hutten-Czapska v. Poland** [GC], no. 35014/97, §§ 160-161, ECHR 2006-VIII, **Bittó and Others v. Slovakia**, no.30255/09, § 101, 28 January 2014; and **R & L, s.r.o. and Others**, cited above, § 108).*

(b) Whether the Maltese authorities observed the principle of lawfulness and pursued a "legitimate aim in the general interest"

53. *The first requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions be lawful. In particular, the second paragraph of Article 1, while recognising that States have the right to control the use of property, subjects their right to the condition that it be exercised by enforcing "laws". Moreover, the principle of lawfulness presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application (see, mutatis mutandis, **Broniowski v. Poland** [GC], no. 31443/96, § 147, ECHR 2004-V, and **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 53).*

54. *Furthermore, a measure aimed at controlling the use of property can only be justified if it is shown, inter alia, to be "in accordance with the general interest". Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the "general" or "public" interest. The notion of "public" or "general" interest is necessarily extensive. Finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, the Court has on many occasions declared that it will respect the legislature's judgment as to what is in the "public" or "general" interest unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see, mutatis mutandis, **Hutten-Czapska**, cited above, §§ 165-66, and **Fleri Soler and Camilleri v. Malta**, no. 35349/05, § 65, ECHR 2006-X).*

55. *The Court finds that the restriction was imposed by the Reletting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance and was "lawful" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This was not disputed by the parties.*

56. *As to the legitimate aim pursued, the Government submitted that the measure, as applied to commercial premises, aimed to protect the stability of businesses and the public services such businesses provided. The measure was also aimed at protecting the employment of those persons*

*who depended on the activity of those businesses and safeguarded against property owners taking advantage of the economic activity of a tenant. The Court observes that the Commission has previously accepted that rent regulation to preserve the economic viability of commercial enterprises in the interest of both those enterprises and the consumer, was in the general interest (see **G v. Austria** no. 12484/86, Com. Dec., 7 June 1990). Similarly, the Court can accept that, in principle, the overall measure, which also applied to commercial premises, may be considered as being in the general interest.*

(c) Whether the Maltese authorities struck a fair balance

57. *In each case involving an alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must ascertain whether by reason of the State's interference, the person concerned had to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden (see **James and Others**, cited above, § 50, and **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 57).*

58. *In assessing compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must make an overall examination of the various interests in issue, bearing in mind that the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are "practical and effective". It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. That assessment may involve not only the conditions of the rent received by individual landlords and the extent of the State's interference with freedom of contract and contractual relations in the lease market, but also the existence of procedural and other safeguards ensuring that the operation of the system and its impact on a landlord's property rights are neither arbitrary nor unforeseeable. Uncertainty – be it legislative, administrative or arising from practices applied by the authorities – is a factor to be taken into account in assessing the State's conduct (see *Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy*, [GC], no. 22774/93, § 54, ECHR 1999-V, and *Broniowski*, cited above, § 151).*

59. *The Court notes, in the first place, that the Government's final argument (submitted at an advanced stage in the proceedings, see paragraph 46 above) is*

misconceived in so far as the property they were referring to was not the property at issue in the present case. From the documents and submissions provided to the Court it transpires that the property is in use and thus the applicants were not entitled, on the grounds established by law (Article 12 of Ordinance, paragraph 26 above), to evict the tenant.

60. *The Court observes that in the present case the lease was subject to renewal by operation of law and the applicants had no possibility to evict the tenant on the basis of any of the limited grounds provided for by law. Indeed, any such request before the RRB, in the circumstances obtaining in their case, would have been unsuccessful, despite the fact that the tenant was a commercial enterprise that possessed other property (a matter which has not been disputed), as the latter fact was not a relevant consideration for the application of the law. Furthermore, the applicants were unable to fix the rent – or rather to increase the rent previously established by their predecessor in title. The Court notes that, generally, increases in rent could be done through the RRB. They were, however, subject to capping, in that any increase could not go beyond 40% of the fair rent at which the premises were or could have been leased before August 1914. Indeed, in the applicants' case no increase was possible at all, because the rent originally fixed in 1971 was already beyond the capping threshold.*

61. *Whereas the RRB could have constituted a relevant procedural safeguard by overseeing the operation of the system, in the present case it was devoid of any useful effect, given the limitations imposed by the law (see, mutatis mutandis, see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 62 and **Anthony Aquilina v. Malta**, no. 3851/12, § 66, 11 December 2014). Consequently, the application of the law itself lacked adequate procedural safeguards aimed at achieving a balance between the interests of the tenants and those of the owners (ibid and, mutatis mutandis, **Statileo v. Croatia**, no. 12027/10, § 128, 10 July 2014).*

62. *The Court further notes that for the first decade of the rental contract, during which – according to the applicants – the market value of the property was EUR 7,000, the rent payable to the applicants was EUR 862 a year. Subsequently, for the year 2010 the rent amounted to EUR 990, for 2011 EUR 1,138, for 2012 EUR 1,309 and for 2013 EUR 1,505. For the years 2014 onwards it would increase by 5% a year. The*

*Court reiterates that State control over levels of rent falls into a sphere that is subject to a wide margin of appreciation by the State, and its application may often cause significant reductions in the amount of rent chargeable. Nevertheless, this may not lead to results which are manifestly unreasonable, such as amounts of rent allowing only a minimal profit (see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 62). While the applicants do not have an absolute right to obtain rent at market value, the Court observes that, despite the 2009 amendments, the amount of rent is significantly lower than the market value of the premises as submitted by the applicants, which was not effectively contested by the Government. However, the applicants have not argued that they were unable to make any profit. Even so, this element must be balanced against the interests at play in the present case.*

63. *While the Court has accepted above that the overall measure was, in principle, in the general interest, the fact that there also exists an underlying private interest of a commercial nature cannot be disregarded. The Government have not argued that in the present case the viability of the tenant's commercial enterprise was in any way dependent on the favourable conditions of the lease on the premises used for storage – a matter which was irrelevant in the application of the law to the premises. In such circumstances, both States and the Court in its supervisory role must be vigilant to ensure that measures such as the one at issue, applied automatically, do not give rise to an imbalance that imposes an excessive burden on landlords while allowing tenants of commercial property to make inflated profits. It is also in such contexts that effective procedural safeguards become indispensable.*

64. *Lastly, the Court notes that unlike in other rent-control cases where the applicants were in a position of uncertainty as to when and if they would recover their property (see, inter alia, **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 61, and **Saliba and Others v. Malta**, no. 20287/10, § 67, 22 November 2011), in the present case, under the laws currently in force and in the absence of any further legislative interventions, the applicants' property will be free and unencumbered as of 2028. It follows that the effects of such rent regulation are circumscribed in time. However, the Court cannot ignore the fact that by that time, the restriction on the applicants'*

rights would have been in force for nearly three decades, and to date has been in force for over a decade.

65. Having assessed all the elements above, and notwithstanding the margin of appreciation allowed to a State in choosing the form and deciding on the extent of control over the use of property in such cases, the Court finds that, having regard to the relatively low rental value of the premises and the lack of procedural safeguards in the application of the law, a disproportionate and excessive burden was imposed on the applicants, who have had to bear a significant part of the social and financial costs of supporting a commercial enterprise. It follows that the Maltese State failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the applicants' right to the enjoyment of their property.

66. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

Fid-decizjoni li tat I-ECtHR fil-11 ta` Dicembru 2018 fil-kaz ta` **Buttigieg and others v. Malta** ingħad :-

"41. The Court notes that it has found in plurality of cases against Malta concerning the same subject matter that, despite the considerable discretion of the State in choosing the form and deciding on the extent of control over the use of property in such cases, having regard to the low rental value which could have or was received by the applicants, their state of uncertainty as to whether they would ever recover the property (despite more recent amendments), the lack of procedural safeguards in the application of the law and the rise in the standard of living in Malta over the past decades, a disproportionate and excessive burden was imposed on the applicants who were made to bear most of the social and financial costs of supplying housing accommodation (see Amato Gauci, cited above, § 63; Anthony Aquilina v. Malta, no. 3851/12, § 67, 11 December 2014; and Cassar v. Malta, no. 50570/13, § 61, 30 January 2018). In those cases the Court found that the Maltese State had failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the applicant's right of property and that

there had thus been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention.

42. Having regard to the facts of the case and the parties' observations, the same considerations apply in the present case. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention."

ii) Gurisprudenza tal-Orati Maltin

Fejn jidhol I-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni, bosta kienu matul is-snin id-decizjonijiet tal-qrati tagħna fejn kienet dikjarata vjolazzjoni. Il-lista tad-decizjonijiet hija twila u facilment traccjabbli. Fl-assjem tagħhom id-decizjonijiet kien mirquma, attenti u ndirizzaw il-qofol tal-kwistjoni. Kellhom piz sinjifikanti li wassal għal bidla fil-legislazzjoni. Fl-istess waqt il-qorti tghid li I-bidliet fil-legislazzjoni kien tardivi. Min-naha tal-Istat matul is-snin kien hemm wisq tkaxxir tas-saqajn li wassal għal pronunzjamenti wieħed wara l-iehor mill-ECtHR kontra pajjizna. Fil-qasam tal-harsien tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tal-persuna, il-qawl : *meglio tardi che mai* : ma jagħmel ebda sens. Ragunament ta` dik ix-xorti forsi jagħmel sens għall-gejjieni ; certament pero` ma jagħmel ebda sens għall-imghoddi. Fejn si tratta ta` ksur ta` jeddijiet fondamentali, I-Istat għandu l-obbligu, ladarba qeqhdin nghixu f`socjeta` demokratika fondata fuq is-saltna tad-dritt u l-għustizzja, li jiddritta l-imghawweg fil-pront u bla dewmien.

iii) Sfond storiku legali/Risultanzi

Meta sar il-Kap 16 fl-1868, is-suq tal-kera kien totalment hieles b`mod u manjiera illi meta tagħlaq kirja s-sid kellu l-jedd jgholli l-kera jew ma jgeddidhiex. Meta la s-sid u lanqas l-inkwilin ma kien jitkolbu tibdil fil-kondizzjonijiet tal-kirja, il-kirja kienet tiggedded *ope legis*.

Wara l-Ewwel Gwerra Dinija, il-kirjet bdew jogħlew b`rata mghaggla. Għalhekk kienet mehtiega regolamentazzjoni. L-Att I tal-1925 kien l-ewwel att legislattiv li kien intiz sabiex jirregola zidiet fil-kera tant li mpona arbitragg meta ma kienx jintla haq ftehim dwar iz-zidiet fil-kera. Dan l-Att kellu jkollu effett temporanju sal-31 ta` Dicembru 1927.

Inhasset il-htiega ta` kontroll aktar strett. Ghalhekk sar I-Att XXIII tal-1929, fejn is-sidien kienu prekluzi milli jghollu I-kera jew milli jirrifjutaw li jgeddu I-kera minghajr il-permess tal-Bord li Jirregola I-Kera. Il-Bord inghata s-setgha illi jilqa` talbiet ghal zgumbrament biss wara li jkunu sodisfatti numru ta` kondizzjonijiet. In kwantu ghal talbiet ta` zieda fil-kera, il-Bord seta` jawtorizza awment sa massimu ta` 40% tal-kera gusta f` Awissu 1914. Din il-mizura wkoll kellha tkun wahda temporanja sakemm is-suq jistabilizza ruhu. L-Att XXIII tal-1929 kelli jkollu effett sal-31 ta` Dicembru 1933.

L-Ordinanza XXI tal-1931 li Tirregola t-Tigdid tal-Kiri ta` Bini (illum Kap 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta) hadet post I-Att XXIII tal-1929 u kienet intiza sabiex ikollha effett sal-31 ta` Dicembru 1933 ghalkemm in segwitu saret definittiva. Il-ligi kienet necessitata minn nuqqas qawwi ta` djar ta` abitazzjoni wara l-herba tat-Tieni Gwerra Dinija. Ghalhekk kien mehtieg illi I-kera tad-djar titrazzan fi zmien ta` skarsezza sabiex il-valur lokatizju jkun gust. Kien frott dan l-intervent legislattiv illi hafna nies setghu jifilhu jhallsu sabiex ikollhom saqaf fuq rashom. Waqt li l-ligi serviet l-iskop originali tagħha, maz-zmien gabet magħha konsegwenzi negattivi fis-sens illi bdiet toħnoq is-suq u bdew jonqsu l-postijiet disponibbli ghall-kera.

Kien biss snin wara bl-Att XXXI tal-1995 illi l-legislatur addotta posizzjoni differenti sabiex jagħti nifs lis-suq tal-kera. B`dak I-Att il-kirijiet il-godda u cioe` dawk li jsiru wara l-1 ta` Gunju 1995 ma baqghux soggetti għal-ligijiet specjali tal-kera. Ghall-kirijiet li saru qabel l-1 ta` Gunju 1995 baqghu jghoddu l-ligijiet ta` qabel ; ghalkemm saru emendi fil-kaz ta` dawn il-kirja, il-piz fuq is-sidien fis-sostanza ma ttaffhix.

iv) Konsiderazzjonijiet

L-Ordinanza XXI tal-1931 kellha skop legittimu u saret fl-interess generali ghaliex kienet mahsuba sabiex tevita sitwazzjoni fejn persuni jispiccaw minghajr saqaf fuq rashom. L-istorja socio-ekonomika ta` dawn il-Gzejjer turi li din il-ligi kienet necessarja. Fl-istess waqt għandu jingħad li t-tkattir tal-gid fil-kors tas-snин wera li dak l-intervent legislattiv, ghalkemm kelli propositi tajbin, ma kienx baqa` joffri bilanc, anzi holoq sproporzjon u zvantagg evidenti u notevoli ta` parti fil-konfront ta` ohra.

Abbinati l-fatti tal-kaz tal-lum mal-insenjamenti gurisprudenziali, il-qorti tqis illi d-disposizzjonijiet dwar it-tigdid awtomatiku tal-kera kif ukoll il-kontroll fl-ammont tal-kera huma mizuri mahsuba sabiex jikkontrollaw l-uzu u t-tgawdija tal-proprijeta`. Kemm il-modalita` tat-tigdid tal-kera u kif ukoll il-kontroll fl-ammont ta` kera percepibbli jikkostitwixxu interferenza fl-uzu u t-tgawdija tal-proprijeta`.

Jirrizulta ppruvat illi l-kera li r-rikorrenti setghu jippercepixxu minhabba l-effetti tal-Kap 69 meta mqabbla mal-kera fis-suq hieles oggettivamente hija bil-wisq baxxa. Fil-kaz ta` llum il-kirja bdiet fl-1969. Matul is-snin il-kera baqghet dejjem ta` Lm 12 fix-xahar sakemm dahlu fis-sehh l-emendi tal-Att X tal-2009. Kienet x`kienet ir-raguni li wasslet ghall-kirja fis-snин sittin favur l-inkwilina Fletcher, jibqa` l-fatt illi jekk dak iz-zmien is-sid ried jiehu xi gwadann mill-proprieta` tieghu ma kellux triq ohra hlief illi jottempra ruhu mal-ligijiet vigenti. Zgur illi ma kienx previst mis-sid li kien sejjer ikun hemm bdil tant qawwi `I fuq fis-suq tal-kera li gab mieghu bidla fil-ligijiet. Din il-qorti hija tal-fehma illi kienu x`kienu c-cirkostanzi meta nkera l-post, anke jekk kien diga` fis-sehh il-Kap 69, b`daqshekk ma jfissirx illi bl-applikazzjoni ta` dik il-ligi fir-realtajiet tas-socjeta` nostrana, il-qaghda tagħhom bhala sidien kienet ben tutelata.

L-istat ta` nuqqas ta` ghazla kienet realta` fil-pajjiz tagħna li thalla jippersisti mill-Istat sa zminijiet ricenti. L-isvolta lejn l-ahjar giet unikament minhabba s-sentenzi tal-ECtHR u tal-Qorti Kostituzzjonali tagħna. Hemm kien dikjarat *senza se e senza ma* li bl-applikazzjoni tal-ligijiet specjali tal-kera sehh ksur tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tas-sidien. Fid-deċiżjoni tal-ECtHR fil-kaz ta` **Zammit and Attard Cassar v. Malta** (op. cit.) kien rimarkat illi :- "at the time, the applicants' predecessor in title could not reasonably have had a clear idea of the extent of inflation in property prices in the decades to come ..." (para 50). Fis-sentenza li tat il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fid-29 ta` April 2016 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Maria Ludgarda sive Mary Borg v. Rosario Mifsud et** ingħad illi :-

"*kien biss fl-ahhar snin illi ghall-ewwel darba gie dikjarat li l-Artikolu 12(2) jilledi d-dritt fundamentali protett taht l-Artikolu 1 tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea (sentenza tal-Qorti Ewropea fil-kaz Amato Gauci vs Malta, 15 ta` Dicembru 2009). Dan m`huwiex kaz ta` ksur ta` dritt fundamentali li jsehh ta` darba, izda vjolazzjoni kontinwata tal-Artikolu 1 tal-Ewwel Protokoll. Fic-cirkostanzi dan l-*

argument hu nfondat. Issir ukoll riferenza ghas-sentenza tal-Qorti Ewropea fil-kaz Anthony Aquilina v Malta Applikazzjoni 3851/12) tal-11 ta` Dicembru 2014, li kienet titratta wkoll kaz ta` controlled rent. Minkejja li s-sid kien baqa` jircievi l-ker a l-qorti xorta ddikjarat ksur tal-Artikolu 1 tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni, ghalkemm ikkunsidrat dan `il fatt meta llifikwidat id-danni.”

(ara wkoll : **Rose Borg v. Avukat Generali et** deciza mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fil-11 ta` Lulju 2016 ; u **Rebecca Hyzler et v. Avukat Generali et** deciza minn din il-Qorti diversament presjeduta fid-9 ta` Mejju 2018)

Bl-emendi l-aktar ricenti gara li filwaqt li l-inkwilini nghataw protezzjoni, ma garax l-istess lis-sidien li kellhom joqghodu ghal dak li kienet tipprovdi l-ligi ghaliex il-legislatur naqas milli joffrilhom rimedju adegwat skont il-ligi ordinarja sabiex joggezzjonaw b`mod effettiv ghar-restrizzjonijiet fuq il-kundizzjonijiet lokatizji. L-uniku triq disponibbli ghas-sidien kienet li jfittxu kenn quddiem il-qrati ta` indole kostituzzjonali jew konvenzjonali (ara s-sentenza li tat din il-Qorti diversament presjeduta fil-11 ta` Mejju 2017 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Josephine Azzopardi et vs L-Onorevoli Prim Ministru et**).

Tajjeb jinghad illi a tenur tal-Art 14 tal-Kap 69 is-sid illi “*rid jgholli l-ker a jew ibiddel il-kondizzjonijiet tal-kiri*” kelly jsegwi l-procedura stabbilita fl-Ordinanza, u jindika l-kondizzjonijiet il-godda qabel l-iskadenza tal-kirja. L-inkwilin jibqa` bil-jedd illi jressaq l-oggezzjonijiet tieghu quddiem il-Bord li Jirregola l-Kera. Ghad illi l-legislatur haseb ghal ezenzjoni ghar-regola stabbilita fl-Art 3, fl-istess waqt holoq eccezzjoni bl-Art 4 ghaliex kienu limitati s-setghat tal-Bord billi dan ma setax jawtorizza awment fil-kera li jkun oghla minn 40% tal-valur lokatizju tal-fond kif kien fl-1914. Anke fil-kaz li s-sid jitlob lura l-pussess tal-fond, il-legislatur haseb ghal cirkostanzi specifici fejn il-Bord jista` jilqa` t-talba tas-sid. Dan johrog mid-dispost tal-Art 9 tal-Kap 69. L-assjem tal-premess iwassal ghall-fehma li l-uniku rimedju tajjeb u effettiv li kellhom ir-rikorrenti kien proprju procediment bhal dak tal-lum.

Kif inghad minn din il-qorti diversament presjeduta fis-sentenza li tat fit-30 ta` Mejju 2018 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **David Pullicino et vs Avukat Generali et** :

*"Il-fatt wahdu li sid jipprova jikseb l-akbar gid minn sitwazzjoni legali li tikkundizzjonah, ma jfissirx b`daqshekk li jkun qabel ma` dik il-qaghda u warrab kull ilment li jista` għandu dwar ic-caħda jew l-indhil fit-tgawdija ta` hwejgu minhabba f`ligi bhal dik jew illi rrinunzja ghall-jedd li jitlob rimedju (ara **Robert Galea vs Avukat Generali et**, 07/02/2017)"*

Jirrizulta għalhekk illi l-kirja tal-fond de quo kienet imgedda ope legis b`mod u manjiera illi s-sid kien kostrett a suo malgrado li joqghod għal dak ir-regim ta` dritt certament sfavorevoli għali. Anke li kieku ntalab awment fil-kera, il-ligi ma kinitx tipprovdi għal kondizzjonijiet biex eventwali awment ikun tassep reali u gust. Għalhekk ir-rikorrenti u l-awturi tagħhom ma kellhomx rimedji effettivi.

Mhuwiex in diskussjoni l-jedd tal-Istat illi jikkontrolla b`legislazzjoni l-uzu tal-proprjeta` meta dan ikun fl-interess pubbliku. Fl-istess waqt l-Istat huwa obbligat juri li fl-applikazzjoni ta` dik il-legislazzjoni jkunu qegħdin jinżammu bilanc u proporzjonalita` bejn l-interess generali u ta` dak privat. Il-kwistjoni għandha tibqa` nkwardata madwar il-fatt illi bl-applikazzjoni tad-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 għas-sitwazzjoni tar-rikorrenti qed ikun hemm ksur tal-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni. Fil-kaz tar-rikorrenti huwa ppruvat sproporzjon notevoli kontra tagħhom fir-ritorn li jista` jkollhom li kieku t-tgawdija tal-propjeta` kellha tithalla tilhaq il-milja tagħha.

Huwa evidenti li matul iz-zmien anke l-legislatur irrealizza li dak li wasslu biex jintervjeni fl-1931 kien jehtieg ripensament motivat minn bidla lejn l-ahjar fil-qaghda ekonomika u socjali tal-pajjiz. Il-qorti tosserva illi waqt illi bl-Att XXXI tal-1995 il-legislatur intervjena favur il-liberalizzazzjoni tal-kera, ghazel illi jillimita dan għal dawk il-kirjet illi bdew wara l-1 ta` Gunju 1995, bil-konsegwenza illi kollox baqa` kif kien għal dawk il-kirjet (bħal din tal-lum) li kienu saru qabel l-1 ta` Gunju 1995.

Tajjeb jingħad illi bl-emendi li kienu ntrodotti ghall-Kap 16 bl-Att X tal-2009, għad li kien hemm awment fil-kera, xorta wahda baqa` jirrizulta sproporzjon kontra r-rikorrenti bejn l-awment fil-kera skont l-Art 1531C tal-Kap 16 u l-valur lokatizju tal-fond fis-suq hieles. Dan oltre għall-fatt li s-sid baqa` kostrett joqghod għal quantum ta` zieda dettagħ mil-ligi li stabbiliet mhux biss kemm għandu jkun l-awment izda

anke kull meta. Qabel id-dhul fis-sehh tal-emendi, ir-rikorrenti odjerni kienu ilhom snin twal igarrbu lezjoni tal-jedd taghhom skont I-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni.

Fid-decizjoni tagħha tal-11 ta` Dicembru 2014 fil-kaz ta` **Anthony Aquilina v. Malta** I-ECtHR irrimarkat illi : "the 2009 and 2010 amendments (only) slightly improved a landlord's position".

Fil-kaz ta` **Zammit and Attard Cassar v Malta** (op. cit.) I-ECtHR irrimarkat :-

"While the applicants do not have an absolute right to obtain rent at market value, the Court observes that, despite the 2009 amendments, the amount of rent is significantly lower than the market value of the premises as submitted by the applicants, which was not effectively contested by the Government. ...While the Court has accepted above that the overall measure was, in principle, in the general interest, the fact that there also exists an underlying private interest of a commercial nature cannot be disregarded."

Fil-kaz ta` **Ian Peter Ellis et v. Avukat Generali et**, (op cit) il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali stabbilit illi :-

"Lanqas l-emendi ghall-Kodici Civili li sehhew bl-Att tas-sena 2009 ma jistgħu jitqiesu bhala li jagħtu rimedju effettiv ghall-lanjanzi tar-rikorrenti, kemm ghax tezisti diskrepanza enormi bejn l-awment fil-kera kontemplat fl-artikolu 1531C u l-valur lokatizju tal-fond fis-suq hieles, kif ukoll ghax id-disposizzjonijiet tal-artikolu 1531F, fic-cirkostanzi tal-kaz, jagħmlu remota l-possibilita` li dawn jipprendu l-pussess tal-fond tagħhom."

B`referenza ghall-kaz tal-lum, jirrizulta ppruvat illi l-kera percepita mir-rikorrenti, abbażi tad-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69, hija bil-wisq inferjuri ghall-kera fis-suq. Il-figuri li saret referenza għalihom aktar kmieni jitkellmu wahedhom. Għalhekk huwa ppruvat l-isproporzjon li ma jridx I-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni u li qed jingarr mis-sid. Hija l-fehma konsiderata ta` din il-qorti illi meqjusa l-fatti u

cirkostanzi tal-kaz tal-lum kif evolvew mal-medda tas-snin sal-lum il-piz li kellu jgorr is-sid kien sproporzjonat u eccessiv.

Il-qorti qegħda tichad l-eccezzjonijiet tal-intimati fil-mertu safejn dawn jolqtu t-tieni talba għar-rigward tal-vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tar-rikorrenti kif tutelati bl-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni. Għalhekk qegħda tilqa` t-tieni talba safejn din tirrigwarda d-dikjarazzjoni ta` ksur tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tar-rikorrenti kif protetti bl-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni.

3. It-tielet (3) talba

Għar-rigward tat-tielet talba kif dedotta, il-qorti tirreferi għas-sentenza li tat il-Qorti tal-Appell fl-24 ta` April 2015 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Michael Angelo Briffa et v. Nadia Merten** fejn ingħad :-

"... illi l-art. 6 tal-Kostituzzjoni jghid car illi "jekk xi ligi ohra tkun inkonsistenti ma` din il-Kostituzzjoni, il-ligi l-ohra għandha, safejn tkun inkonsistenti, tkun bla effett". Il-qorti għalhekk, jekk issib ksur tal-Kostituzzjoni, ma tistax thalli illi, bis-sahha tal-art. 12(4) tal-Kap. 158, issir il-konverzjoni tac-cens ghax jekk tagħmel hekk tkun qiegħda thalli li jingħata effett lil ligi wkoll safejn tkun inkonsistenti mal-Kostituzzjoni (Ara Cedric Mifsud et noe v. Avukat Generali u Carmelo Camilleri, Kost. 31 ta` Jannar 2014). Ir-rimedju għalhekk jista` jkun biss illi l-qorti taqtal-kawza bħallikieku l-art. 12(4) ma għandu ebda effett, i.e. billi ma thallix illi ssehh il-konverzjoni, bil-konsegwenza illi l-konvenuta tibqa` bla titolu."

Il-qorti tikkondividu dan l-insenjament u tagħmlu tagħha.

Tichad it-tielet (3) talba.

4. Ir-raba` (4), il-hames (5) u s-sitt (6) talbiet

Fis-sentenza li tat fis-7 ta` Dicembru 2012 fil-kawza fl-ismijiet **Angela sive Gina Balzan v. L-Onorevoli Prim Ministru et** il-Qorti Kostituzzjonal li qalet hekk :-

"Dwar x`ghandu jkun ir-rimedju, l-ewwel Qorti pprovdiet billi qalet illi l-intimati Bajada ma jkunux jistghu jinqdew bl-Artikolu 12A tal-Kap. 158 biex jilqghu ghal kull azzjoni li tista` tagħmel ir-rikorrenti fil-forum kompetenti biex tikseb l-izgumbrament tagħhom. Din il-Qorti, wara li hasbet fit-tul fuq din il-materja, tara li dan mhux rimedju li tista` tagħti.

Il-bilanc bejn l-interessi differenti jrid joholqu l-Gvern, u hu l-Gvern li jrid ibati l-konsegwenzi jekk jonqos minn dan id-dmirk tieghu. Għan-nuqqas tal-Gvern ma għandux ibati c-cittadin. La darba, f`dan il-kaz, il-ligi per se ma gietx meqjusa li tikser il-Konvenzjoni Ewropeja tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem, ma tistax tigi dizapplikata ghall-kaz. Din il-Qorti già `osservat f`kuntest iehor li meta jkun hemm ordni ta` rekwizzjoni u l-Gvern iqiegħed persuna ohra in situ b`kera li titqies baxxa, ir-rimedju mhux li tithassar dik l-ordni ta` rekwizzjoni izda li jingħata kumpens adegwat bhala just satisfaction u dan talli ma nħoloqx bilanc gust bejn l-interessi involuti. F`dawn ic-cirkostanzi, ma tkunx l-ordni ta` rekwizzjoni nnifisha li tkun kisret id-dritt ta` proprjeta` tas-sid, izda l-mekkanizmu ta` kumpens (ara Montanaro Gauci v. Direttur Akkomodazzjoni Socjali et, deciza minn din il-Qorti fil-25 ta` Novembru 2011). Anke l-kaz meritu ta` din il-kawza m`huwhiex il-passi li ha l-Gvern fl-interess generali li huma hziena izda l-mekkanizmu li holoq biex jigi determinat l-applikazzjoni tal-ligi u l-quantum tal-kumpens. Għalhekk, anke f`dan il-kaz, ir-rimedju għandu jkun ta` kumpens, kif del resto jiaprovdji l-Artikolu 41 ta` Konvenzjoni Ewropeja, l-uniku ligi li nstab li gie miksur.

Din il-Qorti ma tistax tagħti ordni li twassal, wisq probabbli, għat-tkeċċija tal-konjugi Bajada mill-fond inkwistjoni, meta l-protezzjoni nfiska, mogħtija lilhom mill-Gvern, mhux leziva għad-drittijiet tas-sid. Veru li jista jingħad li, f`dan il-kaz, il-konjugi Bajada ma haqqhomx jibqghu fil-post la darba għandhom proprjeta` immobbli ohra, pero`, għal dan ma hasibx il-Legislatur, u ma jahtux il-konjugi Bajada li jippruvaw jieħdu vantagg mil-ligi kif inhi.

Kif osservat il-Qorti Ewropeja tal-Gustizzja fil-kaz ta` Amato Gauci, aktar qabel imsemmi, meta l-ligi ma tiprovdix li s-sid ikun jista` jikkontesta d-dritt tal-enfitewta li juzufriwixxi ruhu bil-beneficci li tagħih il-ligi "on the basis that they were not deserving of such protection, as they owned alternative accommodation", ir-rizultat ikun li "the application of the law itself lacked adequate procedural safeguards aimed at achieving a balance between the interests of the tenants and those of the owners". Kwindi, il-ligi għandha titqies applikabbli ghall-kaz, izda peress li fl-istess ligi jezistu nuqqasijiet procedurali biex jinholoq bilanc gust, irid jingħata kumpens adegwat lis-sid halli "jinholoq" dan il-bilanc."

[ara wkoll : **Dr. Cedric Mifsud et v. L-Avukat Generali et** (25/10/2013) ; **Maria Ludgarda sive Mary Borg et vs Rosario Mifsud et** (29/04/2016) ; u **Rose Borg vs Avukat Generali et** (11/07/2016)]

Fid-decizjoni li nghatat fit-22 ta` Frar 2012 dwar *just satisfaction* fil-kaz ta` **Frendo Randon and Others v. Malta**, I-ECtHR irrimarkat illi :-

16. *As the Court has held on a number of occasions, a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96 §32, ECHR 2000- XI, and Guiso-Gallissay v. Italy Just satisfaction) [GC], no. 58858/00, § 90, 22 December 2009). The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach. This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attached to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (Article 1). If the nature of the violation allows of restitutio in integrum it is the duty of the State held liable to effect it, the Court having neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If; however, national law does not allow - or allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach, Article 41 empowers the Court*

to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate."

Issir referencia wkoll ghal decizjoni ohra tal-ECtHR u cioe` dik tat-12 ta` Gunju 2012 fil-kaz ta` **Lindheim and Others v. Norway** fejn inghad :-

"Whilst in reaching the above conclusion the Court has focused on the particular circumstances of the applicants' individual complaints, it adds by way of a general observation that the problem underlying the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerns the legislation itself and that its findings extend beyond the sole interests of the applicants in the instant case. This is a case where the Court considers that the respondent State should take appropriate legislative and/or other general measures to secure in its domestic legal order a mechanism which will ensure a fair balance between the interests of lessors on the one hand, and the general interests of the community on the other hand, in accordance with the principles of protection of property rights under the Convention."

Bla hsara ghall-kuntest tad-dritt fejn kienet ippronunzjata I-gurisprudenza fuq riferita, din il-qorti tafferma li din il-gurisprudenza tghodd ukoll *mutatis mutandis* ghal-legislazzjoni mertu tal-kawza odjerna. Il-qorti tghid ukoll illi procediment ta` x-xorta tal-lum mhuwiex il-forum appozitu sabiex tinghata decizjoni dwar jekk inkwilin għandux jigi zgħumbrat jew le. Huma t-tribunali jew qrati ordinarji li għandhom il-kompetenza li jesprimu ruhhom dwar talba għal zgħumbrament. Ghall-fini tal-procediment odjern, dik rilevanti hija I-konsiderazzjoni ta` jekk ligi tkunx ivvjolat il-jeddiżiet fondamentali tal-persuna u allura jekk abbażi tal-fattispeci ta` kull kaz dik il-ligi għandhiex tkun applikata bejn il-partijiet kemm-il darba I-applikazzjoni tagħha tkun leziva għad-drittijiet fundamentali tal-persuna koncernata. Fil-kaz tal-lum jirrizulta li I-inkwilina agixxiet skont il-ligijiet vigenti. Għalhekk m`għandhiex legalment tirrispondi għall-kostituzzjonalita` ommeno tal-ligi kif applikata. L-Istat huwa responsabbli għall-promulgazzjoni tal-ligi. Għalhekk għandu jkun I-Istat illi jwiegeb.

Il-qorti qegħda tiddisponi mir-raba` (4) mill-hames (5) u mis-sitt (6) talbiet tar-rikorrenti billi filwaqt illi qegħda tilqa` I-eccezzjonijiet sebgha (7) u tmienja (8) tal-intimata Fletcher

fejn din tirreferi ghall-izgumbrament mill-fond, qegħda tiddikjara li mhijiex sejra tordna l-izgumbrament tal-intimata Fletcher mill-fond de quo izda fl-istess waqt qegħda tiddikjara illi l-intimata Fletcher ma tistax tibqa` tistrieh fuq l-applikazzjoni tad-dispozizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 (kif emendat) sabiex tibqa` tokkupa l-fond de quo.

5. Is-seba` (7) u tmien (8) talbiet

L-Istat rappresentat mill-Avukat tal-Istat **wahdu** huwa responsabbli ghall-promulgazzjoni ta` ligi. Jekk bl-applikazzjoni ta` ligi ssehh vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tal-persuna, l-Avukat tal-Istat **wahdu** għandu jagħmel tajjeb ghall-vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tal-persuna. Għalhekk l-intimata Fletcher m`ghandha tbat xi xejn f`danni jew spejjeż gudizzjarji billi rrizulta li osservat il-ligijiet vigenti li kienu jirregolaw ir-relazzjoni tagħha mar-rikorrenti.

Ir-rikorrenti talbu l-likwidazzjoni ta` kumpens/danni.

i) Gurisprudenza

Huwa principju ben assodat illi l-kumpens li jista` jingħata fi procediment ta` natura kostituzzjonali mhuwiex ekwivalenti għad-danni civili li jigu likwidati mill-qrati ordinarji (ara : QK : **Philip Grech pro et noe v. Direttur tal-Akkomodazzjoni Socjali et** deciza fis-17 ta` Dicembru 2010 ; **Victor Gatt et v. Avukat Generali et** deciza fil-5 ta` Lulju 2011 ; u **Ian Peter Ellis et v. Avukat Generali et** deciza fl-24 ta` Gunju 2016).

Fid-decizjoni ta` **Maria Stella sive Estelle Azzopardi et v. Avukat Generali et** deciza fit-30 ta` Settembru 2016, il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali komplet tippreciza illi r-“*rimedju li tagħti din il-Qorti huwa kumpens ghall-ksur tad-dritt fondamentali u mhux danni civili għal opportunita` mitlufa.*”

Dan premess, huma diversi l-konsiderazzjonijiet li l-qorti għandha tqis sabiex tistabilixxi l-*quantum* tal-kumpens.

Decizjoni li kkunsidrat fid-dettall din il-kwistjoni hija s-sentenza li tat il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fil-kawza **Raymond Cassar Torreggiani et v. Avukat Generali et** (op. cit.)

Il-Qorti qalet hekk :-

*"Dwar il-quantum tal-kumpens dovut issir referenza ghas-sentenza ta` din il-Qorti **Igino Trapani Galea Feriol pro et noe et V Kummissarju tal-Artijiet et** deciza fil-31 ta` Ottubru 2014, fejn f` materja ta` komputazzjoni ta` kumpens ghal lezjoni ta` dritt fondamentali sancit fl-artikolu konvenzjonali fuq citat gie osservat:*

"Rigward il-quantum tal-kumpens stabbilit mill-ewwel Qorti, din il-Qorti tosserva fl-ewwel lok li kull kaz għandu jigi trattat u deciz fuq il-fattispecie tieghu. Barra minn hekk, jekk il-Qorti Ewropeja hasset li f` certi kazijiet kellha tagħti kumpens f` ammont inferjuri għal dak li nghata lir-rikorrenti mill-ewwel Qorti, ma jfissirx li allura l-Qrati Maltin tilfu l-awtonomija tagħhom b` mod li bilfors kumpens li jingħata ikun f` ammont vicin dak li tagħti l-Qorti Ewropeja. Fil-kaz odjern l-ewwel Qorti hadet in konsiderazzjoni l-fatturi kollha li jimmilitaw kemm favur kif ukoll kontra r-rikorrenti u deherilha li l-kumpens xieraq li għandha tagħti f` dan il-kaz ikun fl-ammont ta` hamsa u ghoxrin elf Euro (EUR 25,000). Hija kkonsidrat id-dewmien da parti tar-rikorrenti li jieħdu l-proceduri opportuni, il-valur tal-immobbli, iz-zmien tant twil li r-rikorrenti ilhom privati mill-godiment tal-proprijeta` tagħhom mingħand ma nghata ebda kumpens, l-istat tal-fond u l-ezistenza tal-fattur tal-interess pubbliku. Ma` dawn għandu jigi senjalat il-fatt li qabel l-ispossessament tal-proprijeta` tagħhom ir-rikorrenti kellhom permess mill-Bord kompetenti sabiex jizviluppaw il-fond."

Issa ghalkemm, huwa minnu illi l-valur tal-kumpens akkordat mill-Qorti wara sejba ta` lezjoni tad-drittijiet fondamentali ma jekwiparax necessarjament ma` likwidazzjoni ta` danni civili attwali sofferti, ma jfissirx li d-danni materjali għandhom jigu injorati ghall-finijiet tal-ezercizzju odjern. Il-Qorti trid tqis il-fatturi kollha rilevanti ghall-kaz odjern sabiex tasal għad-determinazzjoni tal-quantum. Dawn huma (1) it-tul ta` zmien li ilha ssehh il-vjolazzjoni konsidrat ukoll fid-dawl tat-tul taz-zmien li r-rikorrenti damu sabiex resqu l-proceduri odjerni biex jirrivendikaw id-drittijiet kostituzzjonali

taghhom ; (2) il-grad ta` sproporzjoni relatat mal-introjtu li qed jigi percepit ma` dak li jista` jigi percepit fis-suq hieles, konsidrat ukoll l-ghan socjali tal-mizura; (3) id-danni materjali sofferti mir-rikorrenti konsidrat ukoll l-ispejjez sostanzjali li ghamlu l-intimati Tabone ssabiex jirrendu l-fond abitabqli u (4) l-ordni li ser taghti din il-Qorti dwar l-ezenzjoni f` da nil-kaz mill-effetti legali tal-Artikolu 5 tal-Kap 158.”

Meta jinghata kumpens fi procediment ta` din ix-xorta, għandu jinghata konsiderazzjoni l-ghan li jkun immotiva l-mizura u cioe` l-interess pubbliku.

Fid-decizjoni **Cassar v. Malta** tat-30 ta` Jannar 2018 (App. 50570/13) l-ECCtHR qalet hekk dwar kif kellu jkun applikat l-Art 41 tal-Konvenzjoni għal dak il-kaz :-

A. Damage

84. The applicants claimed 1,260,996 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. That sum reflected (i) the rent due to them from 1998 to 2015 amounting to EUR 730,330 calculated on the basis of the valuation of an estate agent at EUR 3,500 per month, (EUR 42,000 annually) in 2015, projected backwards to the year 1998 based on two indices for property prices published by the Central Bank of Malta – by means of example, such projections show the rents for the respective years as follows: EUR 6,857 annually in 1988, EUR 18,476 in 1998 and EUR 41,649 in 2008; (ii) EUR 502,006 in simple interest at 8% (capped so as not to exceed the rent of a particular year); and (iii) EUR 28,660 (supported by an architect’s report) in repairs needed to the property since the tenant had failed to take adequate care of the property. In this connection the applicants noted that as things stand, they will remain suffering the effects of the violation even after the Court judgment, for an unspecified amount of years to come. In this light they also considered that their claim of EUR 54,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage already suffered, representing EUR 2,000 annually since 1988, should be upheld in full.

85. The Government submitted that if a violation were to be found a declaration to that effect would suffice. In any event, they considered that the valuations were exorbitant,

speculative and not based on an architect's report. They noted that the property had been purchased in 1988 at EUR 25,600 it had therefore hardly been imaginable that it could now have a rental value of EUR 42,000 annually. Indeed if it had to be divided over the years, their claim in rent amounted to around EUR 27,000 annually which would surely not reflect the rental value in the eighties and nineties. They further considered that since the applicants had accepted rent until 2008, their claim should only refer to the subsequent years. Moreover, the tenant had deposited rent for the period between 2009-15 amounting to EUR 2,796 which had to be deducted from the award of compensation. As to interest the Government noted that under domestic law, interest was due only on amount liquidated, which was not the case here. Moreover a rate of 8% was far beyond any commercial rate of interest currently available in the banking sector in respect of deposits. As to the structural works the Government considered this claim unproven and hypothetical. Lastly, the Government considered that an award under this head should not exceed EUR 10,000, which would be EUR 2,123.66 annually over six years, and an award for pecuniary damage should not exceed EUR 4,000.

86. *The Court notes that the applicants are entitled to compensation in respect of the loss of control, use, and enjoyment of their property from around 2000 to date. The Court notes on the one hand that the rent suggested by the Government is not based on any valuation or other criteria, and appears to be a simple division of an aleatory sum they proposed. On the other hand, while the applicant's valuation is based on an estate agent, and was not accompanied by an architect's report, the domestic court found that EUR 3,000 as opposed to the EUR 3,500 alleged by the applicants appeared reasonable. However, the Court also notes that the comparators used by the estate agent refer to renovated buildings with high quality finishing and furnishing. While no information has been submitted as to the quality of the interior of the applicants' property the Court observes that the applicants claim that their property needs repairs as it has not been well taken care of (see paragraph 84 above). Thus, the latter cannot be considered to be in the same condition and at the same rental value as the former. Therefore, the Court considers that the valuation submitted by the applicants is on the high side, but may nonetheless provide a relevant indication and workable basis.*

87. In assessing the pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants, the Court has, as far as appropriate, considered the estimates provided and had regard to the information available to it on rental values on the Maltese property market during the relevant period. It further notes that from 2008 onwards, the Court found the legitimacy of the aim pursued highly questionable (see paragraph 53 above) and thus does not justify a reduction compared with the free market rental value (compare, **Zammit and Attard Cassar**, § 75; and **Amato Gauci**, § 77, both cited above). It further takes note of the sums already received by the applicants and those, following 2008, which were deposited in court and therefore remain retrievable, which are being deducted from the award.

88. In the present case the Court must, however, also take note of the fact that the applicants bought the property when it was already subject to such restrictions, and therefore it considers that the purchase price at the time reflected such restrictions. While the applicants consider that the Government's claim to that effect was unsubstantiated (see paragraphs 37 and 38 above), the Court notes that according to the evaluations submitted by the applicants, the property in 1988, date when they purchased it, had a rental market value of EUR 6,857 annually. The Court observes that such a sum in rent would not be appropriate for a property purchased in the same year at EUR 25,600, if that were its real sale value. In consequence it must be accepted that the limitations on the property affected the purchase price.

89. The Court reiterates that an award in respect of pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention is intended to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he or she would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred (see, mutatis mutandis, **Kingsley v. the United Kingdom** [GC], no. 35605/97, § 40, ECHR 2002-IV). It therefore considers that interest should be added to the award in order to compensate for the loss of value of the award over time (see **Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom**, nos. 42949/98 and 53134/99, § 52, 10 May 2007). As such, the interest rate should reflect national economic conditions such as levels of inflation and rates of interest (see, for example, **Akkus v. Turkey**, 9 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, § 35; **Romanchenko v. Ukraine**, no. 5596/03, 22 November 2005, § 30, unpublished; and **Prodan v. Moldova**, no.

*49806/99, § 73, ECHR 2004-III (extracts)). It notes that the applicants claimed the statutory rate of eight per cent, and the Government's objection in that respect. The Court considers that a rate of five per cent interest is more realistic (see **Amato Gauci**, cited above, § 78, and **Ghigo v. Malta** (just satisfaction), no. 31122/05, § 20, 17 July 2008) thus a one-off payment at 5% interest should be added (see **Anthony Aquilina**, cited above, § 72, in fine).*

90. Lastly, it is not for the Court to award the claim concerning renovation work which was not entered into by this Court.

91. The Court, thus, awards the applicants the sum of EUR 170,000 jointly.

92. The Court further considers that the applicants must have sustained feelings of anxiety and stress, having regard to the nature of the breach. It therefore awards EUR 3,000 jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

Fuq I-istess binarju kienet id-decizjoni fil-kaz ta` **Portanier v. Malta** tas-27 ta` Novembru 2019 (App. 55747/16).

Inghad hekk:

*"55. The Court notes that it has repeatedly found that the sums awarded in compensation by the Constitutional Court do not constitute adequate redress. The Court makes reference to its considerations in paragraphs 24 and 25 above. The Court considers that, just like an award for pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention, an award for pecuniary damage made by a domestic court must be intended to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred. It transpires from the information and cases brought before the Court that this is often not the case. Such pecuniary awards are also often not accompanied by an adequate award of non-pecuniary damage and/or an order for the payment of the relevant costs (*ibid.* § 90 and *Grech and Others*, cited above, § 62). No domestic case-law dispelling such conclusions has been brought to the Court's attention in the present case.*

56. In the light of the above considerations relating to the relevant time, the Court concludes that although constitutional redress proceedings are an effective remedy in theory, they were not so in practice, in cases such as the present one. In consequence, they cannot be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning arguable complaints in respect of the rent laws in place, which, though lawful and pursuing legitimate objectives, impose an excessive individual burden on applicants.

...

62. The Court must proceed to determine the compensation the applicant is entitled to in respect of the loss of control, use and enjoyment of the property which he has suffered for the period December 2008 to September 2017, when the violation came to an end.

63. The Court notes that the annual rental value of the property estimated on the basis of its sale value according to the court-appointed architect was EUR 5,600. Nevertheless the domestic court considered its value to be more likely EUR 3,000 to 4,000 (see paragraph 14 above). The latter appears to be in line with the Government's architect's valuation which also reflects similar figures. With that in mind, in assessing the pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants, the Court has, as far as appropriate, considered the estimates provided and had regard to the information available to it on rental values on the Maltese property market during the relevant period. It has also considered the legitimate purpose of the restriction suffered, bearing in mind that legitimate objectives in the "public interest", such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value (see, inter alia, *Ghigo v. Malta (just satisfaction)*, no. 31122/05, § 18 and 20, 17 July 2008). Furthermore, the rent already received by the applicant for the relevant period must be deducted.

64. The Court reiterates that an award for pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention is intended to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred. It therefore considers that interest should be added to the above award in order to

*compensate for the loss of value of the award over time. As such, the interest rate should reflect national economic conditions, such as levels of inflation and rates of interest. The Court thus considers that a one-off payment of 5% interest should be added to the above amount (*ibid.*, § 20).*

65. The Court thus awards the applicant EUR 8,000."

Issir referenza wkoll għall-gurisprudenza mill-aktar rienti, senjatament id-deċizjoni tal-ECtHR fil-kaz ta' **Marshall and Others v. Malta** tal-11 ta' Gunju 2020 fejn ingħad :-

"94. *The Court must proceed to determine the compensation the applicants are entitled to in respect of the loss of control, use and enjoyment of the property which they have suffered. However, the Court notes that the only valuation submitted by the court-appointed architect referred to 2014. The rental value of the premises was clearly not the same in the preceding decades. In consequence the Court is unable to identify in which year the disproportionality arose. For the same reasons the Court considers that it has no objective basis on which to determine the pecuniary damage for the years preceding 2014.*

95. *Thus, in assessing the pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants, the Court has, as far as appropriate, considered the estimates provided and had regard to the information available to it on rental values on the Maltese property market during the relevant period. It has also considered the legitimate purpose of the restriction suffered, bearing in mind that legitimate objectives in the "public interest", such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value (see, *inter alia*, Ghigo v. Malta (just satisfaction), no. 31122/05, § 18 and 20, 17 July 2008). In the present case however, the Court keeps in mind that the property was not used for securing the social welfare of tenants or preventing homelessness (compare, Fleri Soler and Camilleri v. Malta (just satisfaction), no. 35349/05, § 18, 17 July 2008). Thus, the situation in the present case might be said to involve a degree of public interest which is significantly less marked than in other cases and which does not justify such a substantial reduction compared with the free market rental value (see, Zammit and Attard, cited above, § 75).*

96. Furthermore, the sums already received by the applicants for the relevant period must be deducted.

97. The Court reiterates that an award for pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention is intended to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred. It therefore considers that interest should be added to the above award in order to compensate for loss of value of the award over time. As such, the interest rate should reflect national economic conditions, such as levels of inflation and rates of interest. The Court thus considers that a one-off payment of 5% interest should be added to the above amount.

98. The Court thus awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 500,000. As requested, the amount awarded is to be paid directly into the bank account designated by the applicants' representatives.

99. Bearing in mind the Constitutional Court's award of EUR 25,000, which remains payable to the applicants, the Court need not award a further sum in non-pecuniary damage, it therefore rejects such claim."

ii) **Likwidazzjoni**

Il-proceduri odjerni min-natura tagħhom huma diretti sabiex jindirizzaw lezjoni kostituzzjonali u/jew konvenzjonali. Il-qorti sabet vjolazzjoni tal-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni. Ghalkemm id-diskrepanza bejn il-kera attwalment percepita u l-valur lokatizju li l-fond igib fis-suq hieles hija fattur determinanti sabiex ikun stabbilit jekk kienx vjolat il-principju tal-proporzjonalita', fl-istess waqt hemm fatturi ohra li l-qorti għandha tqis meta tigi għal-likwidazzjoni tal-kumpens għallezjoni subita. Dwar quantum ta' kumpens, kemm f'danni pekunjarji, kif ukoll f'danni morali, il-qorti tosserva li ma hemmx uniformita' għaliex il-qrat tagħna kienu kawti sabiex iqisu kull kaz fuq il-fattispeci partikolari tieghu.

a) **Danni pekunjarji**

- **Osservazzjoni generali**

**Il-vjolazzjoni lamentata tkopri z-zmien ta` bejn I-1 ta`
Jannar 1965 u I-10 ta` Settembru 2020.**

Fejn si tratta ta` danni pe kunjarji din il-qorti hija tal-fehma li wasal iz-zmien, meta tqis il-quantum tal-likwidazzjonijiet li qeghdin isiru mill-ECtHR f`kazi fejn tirrizulta vjolazzjoni tal-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni li fihom Malta tkun l-intimata, illi fl-ahjar interess tal-gustizzja, il-qrati tagħna jfasslu linji gwida meta tigi biex issir likwidazzjoni, bla ma jiddipartixxu mill-principju li kull kaz għandu jkun gudikat fuq il-fatti u cirkostanzi partikolari tieghu. Fid-decizjoni tal-lum, il-qorti sejra tghid x`għandhom ikunu l-linji gwida u kif għandhom jigu applikati ghall-kaz prezenti.

• **Il-massimu**

Il-kostatazzjonijiet, l-osservazzjonijiet u l-konkluzjonijiet tal-perit tekniku li kien mahtur fil-kawza tal-lum jikkostitwixxu **prova ta` fatt**.

Fir-relazzjoni peritali hemm inkluza tabella (a fol 68). Din turi li ghaz-zmien ta` bejn I-1 ta` Jannar 1965 u I-10 ta` Settembru 2020 il-valur lokatizju fis-suq tal-fond Flat 1, Mayfair Flats, Birkirkara Road, San Giljan, kien ilahhaq total ta` **€86,266**. Dan l-ammont huwa maqsum u mifrux fuq perijodi ta` hames snin bejn l-ewwel u l-ahhar data. Aktar kmieni, il-qorti ddikjarat li kienet sejra tagħmel tagħha dak li rrizulta mir-relazzjoni bhala prova ta` fatt.

Mill-provi tirrizulta inkonsistenza dwar meta effettivament bdiet għaddejja l-kirja. Tghid hekk ghaliex ir-rikorrent Raymond Testa xehed illi kien jiftakar car lill-intimata Fletcher fil-gallerija tal-flat in kwistjoni fl-1965 meta jirrizulta wkoll li kellu biss tliet (3) snin eta`! Għal din il-qorti din l-istqarrija mhijiex affidabbli. Min-naha l-ohra l-intimata Fletcher xehdet illi kienet ilha tghix fil-fond mill-1969. L-istqarrja tal-intimata hija affidabbli tenut kont illi r-rikorrenti ma pprezentawx prova ta` meta bdiet il-kirja, prova din li kienet tinkombi lilhom ladarba kienu qegħdin jippretendu l-hlas ta` kumpens.

Fl-isfond tal-premess, il-qorti tqis illi mit-total tal-valur lokatizju li kien determinat mill-perit tekniku għandu jonqos dak li kien stmat

ghas-snин : 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968. Mit-tabella a fol 68 dawn l-erba` snin igibu total ta` **€1,104** li ghandu jon qos mis-**€86,266**. B`hekk l-istima ghandha tinzel ghal **€85,162**.

Il-figura ta` €85,162 tikkostitwixxi l-massimu tad-danni pekunjarji li pero` ghandu jkun aggjustat skont il-linji gwida li sejra taghti.

- **Linji gwida**

L-isproporzjon bejn il-kera attwalment percepita mir-rikorrenti u dik li setghet tkun ippercepita fis-suq hieles, ghalkemm hija l-fattur ewlieni li jipprova l-vjolazzjoni tal-Art 1 Prot 1 tal-Konvenzjoni, mhuwiex kriterju absolut meta tigi biex isir il-likwidazzjoni tal-kumpens.

Il-qorti rrilevat aktar kmieni li d-danni li jigu likwidati fi procediment kostituzzjonali u/jew konvenzjonali mhumieci danni civili li jigu likwidati f`kawzi kondotti fil-procedimenti ordinarji ghaliex huma danni li jigu likwidati minhabba l-vjolazzjoni accertata tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tal-persuna. Dan ifisser li meta fi procediment tax-xorta bhal dak tal-lum il-qorti tigi biex tagħmel il-likwidazzjoni għandha tqis fatturi li għandhom rilevanza u li jincidu fuq il-komputazzjoni tal-quantum tal-kumpens.

a. **Għandha titnaqqas il-kera li kienet mhallsa u accettata fiz-zmien in kwistjoni**

Jirrizulta ppruvat li l-intimata Fletcher dejjem hallset il-kera dovuta saz-zmien meta din giet rifutata mir-rikorrenti ftit qabel kienet prezentata l-kawza odjerna.

Il-qorti tghid illi kull kera li thallset mill-inkwilina fil-perijodu in kwistjoni għandha tonqos mill-figura ta` €85,162. Sa mill-bidu tal-kirja fl-1969, il-kera mhallsa dejjem kienet fl-ammont ta` Lm 12 ekwivalenti għal €27.95 fix-xahar. Dan ifisser illi l-kera ta` sena tammonta għal €335.52. Il-kirja ilha għaddejja għal 50 sena. Għalhekk, l-ammont ta` kera mhallas fuq medda ta` 50 sena

jamonta ghas-somma ta` **€16,776**. Wara l-2020, il-kera kienet depozitata l-qorti wara r-rifjut tar-rikorrenti.

B` hekk il-figura originali ta` €85,162 għandha tinzel għal €68,386.

b. L-interess generali

Aktar kmieni l-qorti tat sfond storiku-legali ta` x`wassal biex saru l-ligijiet specjali tal-kera. M`ghandhiex dubju mis-siwi u millegittimita` tal-intervent legislattiv tenut kont tal-fatt li fiz-zmien li saru, u anke għal snin wara, taw kenn u wens lil bosta persuni f`dawn il-Gzejjer.

Dan il-fattur għandu jwassal għal tnaqqis ta` 35% fil-figura ridotta ta` **€68,386.**

Adottat rata ta` 35% sabiex tpatti għas-snin l-ohra li ha l-Istat Malti sabiex jipproponi ligijiet li kienu ntizi sabiex isewwu l-isproporzjon li garrbu s-sidien tal-propjeta` mikrija matul is-snин.

Ir-rata kienet tkun diversa li kieku l-Istat Malti għarraf jintervjeni qabel ma beda jsib ruhu rinfaccjat b`decizjonijiet sfavorevoli mogħtija mill-qrati Maltin u mill-ECtHR.

Il-figura għandha tinzel għal figura arrotondata ta` €44,451.

c. Passività` tar-rikorrenti

Ir-rikorrenti damu hamsin sena jaccettaw il-hlas tal-kera.

Jirrizulta illi fil-passat kien sar rikors fil-Bord tal-Kera fejn intalab awment fil-kirja izda t-talba giet michuda.

Fi zminjet aktar ricenti jidher li r-rikorrenti ttentaw jaslu mal-inkwilina ghal kera gdida pero` ma waslux anke ghaliex ma accettawx l-offerta tad-doppju tal-kera li ghamlet l-inkwilina. Kien biss fl-2020 ftit gimghat qabel intavolaw il-proceduri odjerni li r-rikorrenti bdew jirrifutaw il-hlas tal-kera. Kienet l-ghazla taghhom li stennew hamsin sena sakemm ipprezentaw l-azzjoni odjerna.

Li ssir talba sabiex il-valur lokatizju tal-fond jigi stmat b`effett mill-1 ta` Jannar 1965 hija eccessiva u sproporzjonata aktar u aktar meta jirrizulta illi l-kirja bdiet għaddejja mis-sena 1969 u mhux mis-sena 1965.

Il-qorti jidhrilha li r-rikorrenti u l-antekawza taghhom m`għandhomx jithallew jibbenfikaw mill-passivita` tagħhom.

Għalhekk għandu jkun hemm **tnaqqis ulterjuri ta` 35%** minhabba l-komportament kjarament passiv tar-rikorrenti.

Il-figura għalhekk għandha terga` tinzel u ssir **€28,893.15** arrotodata għas-somma ta` **€28,893**.

d. Il-fond

Il-qorti rat ir-relazzjoni.

Tenut kont tan-natura tal-fond, il-qorti ma tarax li għandu jkun hemm tnaqqis fid-danni pekunjarji minhabba dan l-aspett.

e. Riassunt

Id-danni pekunjarji qegħdin jigu likwidati fl-ammont ta` €28,893.

b) Danni mhux pekunjarji

Indipendentement mid-danni pekunjarji li jikkostitwixxu telf effettiv ghar-ragunijiet fuq premessi, il-qorti tghid li r-rikorrenti haqqhom jircieu wkoll il-hlas ta` danni morali fl-ammont ta` €5,000 għaliex sprovvisti kif kienu minn rimedju ordinarju effettiv kif jindirizzaw il-lanjanzi tagħhom kienu kostretti jirriku għal procediment ta` din ix-xorta semplicement għaliex I-Istat Malti qagħad lura għal ghexieren ta` snin milli jsib tarf tal-izbilanc u tal-isproporzjon li kienu qegħdin igarrbu sidien ta` proprjetajiet b`legislazzjoni adegwata u effettiva.

Is-somma globali li qiegħda tigi likwidata fl-ammont ta` €33,893 għandha tithallas biss mill-intimat Avukat tal-Istat.

Decide

Għar-ragunijiet kollha premessi, il-qorti qiegħda taqta` u tiddeciedi din il-kawza billi :-

Tilqa` l-ewwel (1) talba.

Tastjeni milli tiehu konjizzjoni ulterjuri tal-ewwel (1) eccezzjoni tal-intimat Avukat tal-Istat.

Tichad l-ewwel (1) eccezzjoni tal-intimata Georgia Fletcher.

Riferibbilment għat-tieni (2) talba, tilqa` l-eccezzjoni ndikata fil-paragrafu (a) tal-eccezzjoni erbgha (4) tal-Avukat tal-Istat safejn it-talba tittratta vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tar-rikorrenti hekk kif imharsa bl-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni ta` Malta, billi d-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta (inkluzi l-emendi li saru b`effett tal-Att X tal-2009) kienu *saved* bl-Art 47(9) tal-Kostituzzjoni ta` Malta.

Tichad limitatament it-tieni (2) talba safejn tittratta dikjarazzjoni ta` vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tar-

rikorrenti hekk kif imharsa bl-Art 37 tal-Kostituzzjoni ta` Malta.

Tastjeni milli tiehu konjizzjoni ulterjuri tal-eccezzjoni ndikata fil-paragrafu (b) tal-eccezzjoni erbgha (4) tal-Avukat tal-Istat.

Tichad l-eccezzjonijiet fil-mertu tal-intimati safejn bihom kienet ikkontestata t-talba tar-rikorrenti li garrbu vjolazzjoni tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tagħhom hekk kif imharsa bl-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea ghall-Protezzjoni tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem u Libertajiet Fondamentali.

Tilqa` limitatament it-tieni (2) talba safejn tittratta dikjarazzjoni li effett tal-applikazzjoni tad-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta (kif emendat bl-Att X tal-2009) ir-rikorrenti garrbu vjolazzjoni tad-drittijiet tagħhom fir-rigward tal-fond Flat 1, Mayfair Flats, Birkirkara Road, San Giljan, hekk kif dak id-dritt huwa mhares bl-Ewwel Artikolu tal-Ewwel Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea ghall-Protezzjoni tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem u Libertajiet Fondamentali.

Tichad it-tielet (3) talba.

Tilqa` l-eccezzjonijiet numru sebgha (7) u tmienja (8) tal-intimata Georgia Fletcher.

Tipprovdi dwar ir-raba` (4) u l-hames (5) talbiet billi tiddikjara li stante li l-applikazzjoni tad-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta tagħti dritt ta` rilokazzjoni lill-intimata Georgia Fletcher, l-istess intimata ma tistax tibqa` tistrieh fuq dawk id-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 69 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta sabiex tibqa` tokkupa il-fond Flat 1, Mayfair Flats, Birkirkara Road, San Giljan.

Tichad is-sitt (6) talba.

Tiprovdni dwar is-seba` (7) u t-tmien (8) talbiet, billi tillikwida favur ir-rikorrenti kumpens komplexiv fl-ammont ta` tlieta u tletin elf u tmien mijas tlieta u disghin ewro (€33,893) in kwantu ghal tmienja u ghoxrin elf u tmien mijas tlieta u disghin ewro (€28,893) bhala danni pekunjarji u in kwantu ghal hamest elef ewro (€5,000) bhala danni mhux pekunjarji ghall-vjolazzjoni li garrbu tal-jeddijiet fondamentali tagħhom hekk kif dawn huma mharsa bl-Ewwel (1) Artikolu tal-Ewwel (1) Protokoll tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea ghall-Protezzjoni tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem u tal-Libertajiet Fundamental.

Tordna lill-intimat Avukat tal-Istat sabiex iħallas lir-rikorrenti s-somma hekk likwidata, bl-imghax legali b`effett mil-lum.

Tordna li l-ispejjez kollha ta` din il-kawza għandhom jithallsu in kwantu għal nofs mir-rikorrenti u in kwantu għal nofs mill-intimat Avukat tal-Istat.

Tordna lir-Registratur tal-Qorti sabiex kif appena din is-sentenza tghaddi in gudikat jibghat kopja tagħha lill-Ispeaker tal-Kamra tad-Deputati kif irid l-Art 242 tal-Kapitolu 12 tal-Ligijiet ta` Malta.

**Onor. Joseph Zammit McKeon
Imħallef**

**Amanda Cassar
Deputat Registratur**